Security policy of the Slovak Republic in the context of intensifying the hybrid actions of the Russian Federation

Approaching the May 2023 Turkish presidential and assembly elections seemed to promise a challenging situation for the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The significant influx of refugees since the onset of the Syrian civil war introduced a reactive public agenda marked by occasional violent clashes in neighbourhoods with high refugee populations. This eventually spilled over to the national political agenda. A new political party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, ZP), emerged with an anti-Syrian sentiment platform, gaining traction amongst young voters and expanding its electoral appeal. After the 2018 elections, the opposition parties united under the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı, MI), bringing together social democrats, liberals, nationalists and pro-Islamist conservatives to broaden the opposition's appeal and resistance to the ruling AKP. Additionally, the Erdoğan government's policy performance was also deteriorating. The economy deteriorated due to the President's reliance on strict monetary controls and disregard for market dynamics, leading to a depreciating national currency. The opposition's control of the largest cities since 2019 limited the cabinet's ability to regulate projects and manage clientelist networks. The resulting insecurity and vulnerability tarnished the government's image as a stability and good governance provider. The twin earthquakes on 6 February, 3 months before the elections, exacerbated the administration's failure to respond effectively to the disaster. The affected southeastern provinces, home to nearly 10% of the population, suffered extensive loss of life and infrastructure damage. The AKP's 21-year rule seemed to be ending due to poor performance in economics and democratic governance, leading to a potential electoral defeat. However, Erdoğan won the presidency in the second round, and his People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı, CI) secured a comfortable margin for controlling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).1 The question remains: what factors contributed to Erdoğan's remarkable survival against all odds? Who were Erdoğan's supporters, and on what issue bases did they cast their votes for him?2 I examine the factors contributing to Erdoğan's re-election using individual-level post-election data and I argue that his success was primarily based on his performance in various policy areas, such as protecting moral values and easing the use of turban in public spaces, as well as his handling of security and foreign policy. However, his performance in other areas, such as resolving the Kurdish problem, reducing inflation, providing economic welfare and addressing the LGBTQ community's demands, was perceived as relatively low. This duality in his performance allowed him to strategically shift the agenda in favour of more advantageous issue areas, which were favoured by large nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. By successfully positioning himself on these key issues, Erdoğan secured a considerable electoral gain. Optimistic prospective rather than retrospective pocketbook evaluations and support from low-educated middle-to-older age groups, right-wing voters and those who are not problematized by the state of Turkish governance all significantly contributed to Erdoğan's support. However, ethnic and sectarian minority groups, such as Kurds and Alevis, were negatively predisposed to voting for him. The misinformation campaign against the opposition appears to be ineffective in shaping the Erdoğan vote. Turkey has been designated as a candidate for EU membership, but its accession negotiations have been halted since 2018 on account of worries about the rule of law and democratic values. The two election candidates cannot be easily categorized as pro- or anti-EU. Although Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition candidate, was hesitant towards the EU, he promised to regain trust in Western allies, which was unprecedentedly low. Erdoğan's broader alliance now comprises partners with more conservative right-wing and pro-Islamist viewpoints, further constraining his capacity to adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy approach. Erdoğan's eventual victory reinforces his control over Turkish politics, which does not bode well for enhancing Western relations.3 The 2018 elections sparked speculation about an early election in the country. The economic crisis, which significantly depreciated the Turkish lira against the US dollar, further fuelled this expectation. However, the politicization of the financial crisis is mainly due to the AKP candidates' significant losses in the 2019 local elections. This gave new momentum to the opposition and provided potential challengers to Erdoğan's electoral dominance. The 2019 local elections resulted in significant losses for the incumbent CI in major metropolitan areas like Istanbul and Ankara, which had been under conservative control since the mid-1990s.4 Furthermore, the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and independent candidates secured victories in coastal municipalities across the Aegean, Thrace and Mediterranean regions. Although the CI maintained a dominant electoral appeal, securing over 50% of the votes for municipal council and mayoral elections nationwide, they lost control of the largest metropolitan centres. Due to the fragmented support for opposition parties, an alliance was seen as the only viable option for the 2023 elections. The opposition vote base grew in 2018 when the Good Party (İyi Parti, IYIP) entered the electoral scene after splitting from the MHP, attracting centrist AKP supporters who were disenchanted with the party. Although the IYIP held only five seats in the TBMM, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu helped by loaning 15 CHP representatives. This allowed IYIP to form a parliamentary group and avoid collecting signatures for their party leader, Meral Akşener, to run against Erdoğan in the presidential election. The IYIP joined the MI with the CHP, SP and DP in the TBMM elections, securing 9.96% of the vote, whilst Akşener garnered 7.3% (Table 1). The opposition alliance attracted conservative voters away from the AKP-MHP, with many choosing the more centrist IYIP and other right-of-centre parties like the pro-Islamist SP. As the 2023 elections approached, new opportunities arose to expand MI further. Two influential figures from the AKP, the former foreign affairs minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the former foreign affairs minister and deputy prime minister responsible for the economy Ali Babacan, each established their own political parties, the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi, GP) and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, DevaP), respectfully. These high-profile exits from the AKP were interpreted as a sign that disenchanted AKP supporters could be courted. Ultimately, both GP and DevaP joined the MI, forming a so-called 'six-legged table' comprising three splinter parties from AKP and MHP—IYIP, GP and Deva—one pro-Islamist SP, one minor centre-right DP and the main opposition social-democratic CHP. MI's main promise was a return to a fortified parliamentary system, dismantling Erdoğan's presidential system. A long and detailed list of policy promises primarily focused on a rational economic policy and reformed merit-based public sector.5 Kurdish voters' support was also crucial, given the expectation of a close presidential race in 2023. The Kurdish vote already held significant weight with many parliamentarians in the TBMM. The Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, DEMP) decided after lengthy negotiations and the Labor and Freedom Alliance's inner deliberation against fielding a separate presidential candidate, as this individual would have no chance of triumphing over the other major contenders. In this context, the implied support of the DEMP could be instrumental in determining the election's eventual winner. However, given the nationalist sensitivities and ties of the Kurdish parties with the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish state, the United States and the EU amongst other states, any covert or direct appeal via the political parties and their representatives in the TBMM carried considerable political risks that could backfire amongst certain electoral constituencies. Despite the Constitutional Court's threat of closure of the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), the party refused to sever any ties with the PKK. The MI argued that the HDP should be treated like any other legal party and engaged in official or unofficial talks with them. The AKP-MHP campaign, which continued to associate the HDP with the PKK, deterred the MI, particularly the IYIP leadership, from further engaging with the HDP. Although the opposition united against Erdoğan's candidacy in 2023, this unity did not last throughout the campaign. The internal disagreements within the opposition alliance significantly aided Erdoğan's success in the 2023 elections. Opposition leadership competition garnered attention equal to economic crises and natural disasters. The opposition could not easily identify a presidential candidate. Negotiations for the alliance's presidential candidate collapsed a month after the earthquake (see Baruh and Çarkoğlu, 2024). IYIP, the second-largest party in the alliance, expressed dissatisfaction with choosing a winning candidate for the upcoming presidential election. They argued that Kılıçdaroğlu would not secure the presidency if nominated and advocated finding an alternative candidate, suggesting the names of Istanbul and Ankara's metropolitan mayors. Both mayors, CHP members, hesitated to challenge their party leader. The opposition alliance's chances improved with the addition of Ankara and Istanbul's mayors as Kılıçdaroğlu's running mates. However, the alliance's co-operative and competitive dynamics were severely damaged, ultimately hindering a successful campaign. The economic crisis after the 2018 elections was predicted to cause an early election before the crisis's full impact hit. Turkey's economy rebounded strongly after COVID-19, with 5.6% growth in 2022, down from 11.4% in 2021. Exports, investment and manufacturing activities all lost momentum, and the deteriorating external environment and heterodox monetary policies caused the economy to slow down. Despite the central bank's estimated intervention of $108 billion, the Turkish lira fell by 30% in 2022.6 Inflation, which was 20.3% in 2018, escalated to 64% by 2022. Despite the economy's negative impact on the incumbent CI and Erdoğan's electoral chances, the opposition MI's internal issues were the main focus. A major natural disaster disrupted the election agenda, diverting the nation's focus from the incumbent's shortcomings and concentrating more on pressing survival issues. On 6 February, 2023, two major earthquakes significantly impacted 11 provinces, affecting approximately 16.4% of the population and 9.4% of the economy. Direct losses from earthquakes amounted to $34.2 billion, and reconstruction needs could double that amount. Earthquakes exacerbated the delicate macro-financial landscape. The World Bank acknowledged that pre-election spending and reconstruction efforts could promote growth, which is projected to exceed 3% by the end of 2023.7 Indeed, the country's overall GDP growth was 4.5% in 2023. Despite the economic difficulties, the incumbent Erdoğan maintained control over the reconstruction efforts. He used the earthquake's aftermath to regain credibility by providing economic relief, especially as the election neared. Last-minute wage increases and early retirement proposals were implemented to attract key voter groups.8 Erdoğan's campaign relied heavily on his ability to control the media. Turkey ranked 165th out of 180 countries in 2023 in the World Press Freedom Index, dropping from 100th in 2002.9 As such, the country is a typical example of competitive authoritarian regimes that allow for some competition and limited information access in the electoral sphere. However, in these closely orchestrated elections, the cards appeared stacked to favour the incumbent's continued rule (Bermeo, 2016). Independent journalism in these regimes is severely constrained. Media outlets face pressure through arrests, assaults, threats, fines and censorship. Websites and social media platforms are also targeted by trolls. Pro-regime media bias towards favourable coverage of the ruling party leads to a significant disparity in information access for voters (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Opposition's media coverage in May 2023 was limited compared to the ruling alliance and its candidate.10 Erdoğan's messages aimed to distance him from the opposing side, polarizing both ideologically and affectively to bolster nationalist conservative support. Whilst ideological polarization may be providing voters with clear choices (Barber and McCarty, 2015), the growth of social distancing, animosity and incivility amongst political factions is damaging to a healthy democracy. Affective polarization erodes trust, impedes co-operation and leads to discriminatory behaviour towards opposing partisans outside the political sphere (Iyengar et al., 2019). Wagner (2021) ranked Turkey as one of the countries with the highest levels of affective polarization worldwide. Erdoğan's discourse provides clear reasons for escalating affective polarization in Turkey. Often, he claimed the opposition worked with the PKK separatists. Erdoğan claimed during a Konya rally that the opposition follows PKK's Kandil leadership whilst his People's Alliance obeys God's instructions.11 He presented a fabricated video of Murat Karayilan, a co-founder of the PKK, endorsing Kılıçdaroğlu in a rally to prove alleged collaboration. Erdogan's claim of opposition being anti-Islamic and pro-LGBTQ sparked conservative Islamist sentiments.12 Although the EU did not occupy a significant space in the election campaign, Erdoğan claimed Kılıçdaroğlu to be a 'puppet of the West' to complement his portrayal of him as an unpatriotic collaborator with Turkey's nemeses.13 The opposition has similarly spread false information to stereotype refugees and migrants negatively. Kılıçdaroğlu adopted a nationalistic tone in the second round to appeal to voters influenced by Erdoğan's forceful campaign, accusing Erdoğan of bringing 10 million refugees into Turkey and committing himself to returning the Syrians back to Syria if elected. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that the actual number of refugees in the country is approximately 4 million.14 Although both sides used these misinformation messages, it is unclear to what extent different party constituencies found them convincing. Polarized opinions on both ends have intensified the deep rifts surrounding the nature of Turkey's political institutions. One group believes that Turkey is an autocratic regime with oppressive policies, biased media and unfair election practices. The other group sees Turkey as a thriving democracy with considerable influence in global politics. Consequently, the level of satisfaction with the current political system is anticipated to have a varying impact on voter preferences in the upcoming presidential election. In the first round of the presidential election, the sitting President, Erdoğan, and the opposition CHP's candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu, competed against Muharrem İnce, who was the MI candidate in the 2018 election, and Sinan Oğan, a former MHP parliamentarian (see Table 1). İnce's campaign aimed at the opposition rather than the incumbent alliance. He withdrew from the competition 3 days before the election day due to claims regarding his financial status and personal life. The late withdrawal resulted in over 230,000 votes being wasted as his name remained on the ballots. Oğan was part of the Ancestral Alliance (Ata İttifakı, AtaI), a nationalist-conservative group with the ZP and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). He received over 2.8 million votes (5.2%) and backed Erdoğan in the second round, causing the alliance to disband. The initial round of the presidential election yielded a turnout rate of 87.04%. Turnout was notably higher in the western provinces. The low voter turnout in East and Southeast Anatolia, where most Kurdish voters supporting the opposition candidate resided, suggests that low turnout in these regions mainly hurt the opposition. The turnout in the second round was approximately three percentage In the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu his votes but remained million votes The turnout in and southeastern was the opposition's The vote received by Erdoğan in the 2023 elections in the second was nearly to the he received in the 2018 elections Kılıçdaroğlu a in the first round of 2023 compared to the MI candidate Muharrem in 2018 This suggests that a considerable number of who for HDP candidate and IYIP candidate Akşener in 2018 have their support to Kılıçdaroğlu in 2023, the opposition votes his Sinan of Erdoğan may have the in Erdoğan's However, the of after ZP and both of the opposition candidate Kılıçdaroğlu suggests that Oğan may not be in control of his supporters in the second pressure Erdoğan's campaign in the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign adopted an nationalistic and discourse to attract and ZP voters and promised to return Syrian refugees to their home country. This appeal to the nationalists have worked against both the Kurdish voters and his CHP supporters to not vote in the second of voting behaviour in Turkey are on based on and economic voting to Turkish politics, which is by a dominant and that controls a and state The comprising mainly and is and the In the Republican the is by and a nationalist The is a that the efforts and and ethnic with and The bases of the are to into an after the AKP's of the state and of this in voting behaviour is found in with a pro-Islamist conservative amongst relatively in the of large metropolitan cities and who to support the right-of-centre pro-Islamist and nationalist The central constituencies have relatively higher and values A significant of economic evaluations has also been with and the use of misinformation in and social media is with for vote choices and the democratic in the country over more than a during Erdoğan's presidential vote are also to not only on evaluations of performance in different policy areas but also on the overall satisfaction with the Turkish democracy an into Erdoğan was to secure a winning I on a and a post-election One that from these data is that performance evaluations across 15 issue areas a issues are considered when not based on the of LGBTQ and Kurdish issues is relatively low. and economic welfare are closely by national Despite on conservative and nationalist issues such as the use of turban and in public spaces, Syrian refugees or moral values these are of The of issues increases from to as the campaign but back to the initial as the public in The performance evaluations of Erdoğan's are The first together issues that favour the which has relatively higher evaluations compared to the second which together issues the opposition with a relatively performance This is strongly with foreign policy and as well as conservative like the turban issue and the of moral LGBTQ and Kurdish issues, which have the and economic issues such as the of economic welfare and bringing which have amongst the performance all in the second suggesting that this is the that together issues that favour the opposition. These evaluations also a with AKP voters significantly higher The performance are higher for the first for both the AKP and CHP the AKP, the the two is than for the CHP. and of economic evaluations for the and be used to economic voting a prospective evaluations of or pocketbook are more during the 2023 campaign from to May 2023 and during the post-election in Turkey than retrospective (see also 2024). The retrospective evaluations negative and evaluations from to but significantly in the post-election AKP supporters are more and CHP supporters are more than the overall In the of performance evaluations gave Erdoğan a chance to his losses in one of issues, the Syrian Kurdish and issues, with in relatively evaluations in foreign national security and conservative issues such as the turban use in public These performance evaluations also a deep providing an to the in Erdoğan's favour via evaluations also a and to be relatively which provides more for reducing the negative influence of retrospective on the the two candidates in the second round of the May 2023 presidential election, who Erdoğan's voters is no the two but age was a significant in the election, with relatively voters to vote for high and level is already these voters are relatively low voters who are high and are significantly more to vote for the opposition candidate, In to in or in different from of the metropolitan centres. and ethnic of and Kurds are than the Turkish to vote for As the of the the to vote for Erdoğan also to the end of the are significantly more to vote for the prospective pocketbook some amongst the economic As prospective evaluations of the the of voting for Erdoğan the performance of the Erdoğan on the economic before the elections, this finding his electoral Erdoğan's to the economic of the by the wage and providing early retirement to a significant group of to have the damaging influence of retrospective the appeal of the promises for the which relatively more prospective appears to his the two performance the first those issue areas with that favour the the of voting for The of this impact is the largest amongst all Erdoğan's on foreign and security policies and issues for the conservative constituencies gave his campaign an over evaluations in the second which is over different issues not to have affected the vote towards Erdoğan the misinformation claim that opposition alliance the the claim that opposition alliance has entered into with a terrorist who are more with the the Turkish democracy to to vote for the Kılıçdaroğlu voters are more to be amongst the relatively This finding is in with an by that Turkish voters who are on the winning and to in the performance of the country's polarization in the evaluations of the of the political Although the overall level of satisfaction with democracy does not to be high or the of the the in these evaluations attract those who are to vote for in shaping vote opposition party and The expectation of improved performance evaluations in these areas may have Erdoğan's focus on security and foreign policy. The performance foreign policy and security as well as other issues for conservative have a significant impact on the to Erdoğan over that the vote voters who not have a high or higher are more to vote for Kurdish and sectarian of were both negatively predisposed to vote for After controlling for and no of areas or the of metropolitan Erdoğan's vote from right-of-centre voters who high democratic has over the Erdoğan appears to attract voters who are with the Turkish regime of Erdoğan voters are more and Kılıçdaroğlu voters are The misinformation campaign claims the opposition with a organization or supporting the LGBTQ agenda did not have a significant impact on the vote Erdoğan and were not due to issues on the LGBTQ demands, Syrian refugees or the of against as to in economic policy. The the issues the of the Kurdish problem, or the the and more in determining the vote Erdoğan and the presidential system in Turkey was by the those who favoured it The opposition on the issue of the presidential system and its for all However, the of the May 2023 elections it that Turkey to a parliamentary system Erdoğan his is that these elections were but not The of and on democratic and the rule of law are to the the opposition on the and Erdoğan on the winning for campaign on the country's agenda. However, the factors the Erdoğan vote remained Erdoğan relied on his conservative constituencies with low-educated performance in of issues conservative security and foreign policy helped him The election's had for Turkey's democratic and foreign policy Erdoğan adopt a rational economic policy to economic with and growth before the elections. to his due to political like the Istanbul and could his leading to more in economic and other policy areas to opposition these policy areas, security and foreign policy are to occupy an space due to his already credibility and success in the face of his conservative his victory and the resulting over all Erdoğan is to of his and new foreign policy right-wing in is also to more to the other as Turkey's democratic to which is for Erdoğan, who on his conservative to control of the Turkish Grand National in a of the status and continued on the a new electoral of to Erdoğan's is that this from the of and election a new of with the Erdoğan democratic the opposition leadership does not to their for democratic are

As Yugoslavia entered into its final crisis in the spring of 1991, France was still recovering from the shock of the fall of the Berlin wall, which had shaken the very basis of French foreign policy. France could no longer exploit the bipolarity which had created so much room for an independent policy between the United States and the USSR. The unification of Germany, which France had accepted with great reluctance, upset the balance of power within the European Community (EC), which had always favoured unification. Finally, the end of the Cold War called into question a defence policy based on an independent nuclear deterrent. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that France, like the other members of the EC, was at sea when faced with the first major crisis of the new European order. However, if one looks beyond the fluctuations in French policy toward the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that this crisis acted as a catalyst in the process of adapting French foreign policy to the post-Cold War age. In particular, it underscored the limits of the capabilities of the budding European Union (EU) as a political institution and raised serious questions about the aim of establishing a treaty system for European security. Above all the crisis gave France an opportunity to reclaim its position as a leader, not just within the EU, but also worldwide. French policy toward the former Yugoslavia can be divided into three distinct periods: (1) from the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 1991 to the victory of the French right in the March 1993 parliamentary elections; (2) the so-called cohabitation period (April 1993 -- April 1995) between Socialist President Francois Mitterrand and the conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur; and (3) from Jacques Chirac's presidency in May 1995 to the signature of the Dayton peace accord in November 1995. During the first period, foreign policy making was dominated by Mitterrand, supported by his trusted foreign minister, Roland Dumas. It was a time of deep division, not only between the government and the opposition but also within the governing Socialist party. The main architect of French policy toward the former Yugoslavia during the second period was the Gaullist foreign minister, Alain Juppe. Despite the change of government in April 1993, everything indicates that the three main French foreign policy makers (the president, the prime minister, and the minister for foreign affairs) came to an agreement, even though the new government did not hesitate to criticize the policy of its predecessor.(f.1) In the third phase, Chirac sought to establish his mark with a vigorous foreign policy -- beginning with the former Yugoslavia. THE IMPOSSIBLE EUROPEAN SOLUTION The Yugoslav crisis should have given the European Community its first chance to prove that it could settle a problem in its own backyard. In fact, it showed just the opposite. After six months of fruitless attempts to find a solution, the EC was forced to hand the question over to the United Nations early in 1992. However, by sharing the lead in the peace negotiations with a United Nations special envoy, France managed to remain on the front line, at least until the Contact Group was formed in July 1994.(f.2) Unfortunately the crisis happened at the very time that the EC was reflecting on its own future. On the one hand, there was talk of expansion to include other West European countries and possibly some from Eastern Europe. And on the other, the existing member states were seeking ways of strengthening integration among themselves. Events in Yugoslavia were to show that the conditions for formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as provided for by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, were still far from being met. On the contrary, they revealed the deep divisions between the member states and their incapacity to agree on how to handle the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. They also highlighted the fragile nature of the Franco-German axis on which the dynamics of European integration depended. …

With Japan’s new connectivity initiative, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, alongside several previous doctrines, Tokyo has started to shift its regional security policy focus towards democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. Qualitative case studies on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific assess these changes as reflecting a more proactive security policy initiated under the Abe administration (2012–2020). While Tokyo’s security policy towards Southeast Asia has certainly changed both qualitatively and quantitatively since 2012/2013, explaining this change by referring solely to Prime Minister Abe’s foreign policy agenda falls short. Rather, Japan’s new strategy is the result of a change in perceptions among executive officials in the foreign and defense ministries that had already been initiated in the 2000s. This study looks at this development and examines the role of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (Kantei), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in initiating the change and assesses Japan’s Pacific strategy through an interview-based qualitative case study. Using the concept of “foreign policy analysis” and based on official publications and interviews with representatives of the MOD, the MOFA, and Kantei advisors, this study expands the qualitative aspect of existing research and shows that the origins of this new regionalism are found primarily in the changing perceptions of executive officials. It also points to the importance of analyzing administrative executives at the interface among Kantei, the MOFA, and the MOD, which can shed new light on the reasons behind Japan’s regional strategy shift.

The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most eminent Russian politicians of the twentieth century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy have undergone a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been dominated by neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic options, whose representative was predominantly Primakov’s predecessor as the minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka’s government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up market reform, but called for the state’s participation to be increased. Yevgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. Primakov exerted a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin’s day. His political line was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense, and nothing indicates that this state of affairs has changed, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.

The article questions how strong Europeanisation is as an explanation of administrative changes in EU member states. Denmark has an opt-out from the European cooperation on defence, and, therefore, its defence administration represents a critical or a less likely case to test the Europeanisation thesis. The article shows that in spite of the opt-out, the administrative structures and the policy processes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have adapted to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and defence policy (ESDP). Surprisingly, the administrative structures and the decision-making processes in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have also adapted to the ESDP. The latter example emphasises the strength of top-down Europeanisation as a possible explanation of domestic administrative changes in member states. It is argued that Europeanisation per se is not an explanation of administrative adaptation. The pressure from Europeanisation has to be propagated by actors. In the case of the Danish defence administration, the promoter is government officials embedded in a domestic political–bureaucratic environment, which is remarkably positive towards the integration process within the EU. It explains the strategic choices of the officials, and, thereby, it explains the administrative adaptations of the MoD and the MFA.

In the history of Indonesia’s foreign policy, there are often differences in attitudes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in responding to international issues. The Ministry of Defense seems to act unilaterally and pays little attention to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in expressing attitudes and views regarding Indonesia’s foreign policy. There are disagreements between two ministries that cause polemics and pros and cons in government circles which eventually evaporate in public space. This paper analyzes the lack of synergy between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in addressing international problems, which seem to work independently. This paper argues that a one-door policy in Indonesian foreign policy is needed, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be positioned as the only door in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, which the Ministry of Defense must submit to and comply with and synergy with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy issues.

Joining the European Union (EU) has had a transformative effect for the foreign policies of the new member states and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs). There is a growing body of literature that analyses Europeanisation of foreign policies of EU member states as a result of their participation in Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the same time, the significance of learning in bringing change in foreign policy remains underexplored avenue of international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). This article demonstrates how learning processes can contribute to the processes of Europeanisation and shows what are the possible inhibitors to institutionalisation of the lessons learnt at individual level.

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

The article describes the debate on foreign policy of the post-Soviet Russia, which took place at the Academic Council of IMEMO in 1992–1994. What are the national interests of the Russian young democracy? What should be Russian foreign policy in the new geopolitical situation, after the collapse of the USSR? To what extent the transformation of socio-political system in Russia changed the nature of its foreign policy? What should be its principles and priorities after the end of the Cold War? All these and other questions were in the focus of IMEMO experts immediately after the collapse of the communist regime in 1991. From the outset, the discussions were marked by different approaches to the issues. Some experts put forward as a priority the relations with the U.S. and the West in general, some put Europe in the first place, and others  - the Commonwealth of Independent States, which brought together some of the former Soviet republics. But all IMEMO experts in general agreed on the negative evaluation of the new Russian foreign policy quality: the default of a senior management for clear understanding of strategic and tactical foreign policy goals, low professional level of those who were called to form and implement foreign policy, the absence of a single center for decision-making, the lack of coordination between various authorities involved in the development of a foreign policy strategy  - Presidential Administration, Security Council, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Parliament, etc. As mentioned in the discussions, the initial stage of idealistic notions and expectations of the West prevalent in Russian society and in the new ruling elite circles after the fall of the Soviet regime was soon replaced by disappointment and even irritation towards the West. Both of these trends were equally dangerous to the interests of the Russian foreign policy, which was in great need of a pragmatic, professional understanding of realities. This policy had to achieve two main objectives  - full integration of Russia into the world community of developed democracies, and protection of its own national interests within this community. One should have been inextricably linked with the other. Academic understanding of national interests in the field of foreign, defense and economic policies, the development of specific proposals and recommendations on these issues for the state leadership has become one of priorities for IMEMO analysts. Acknowledgements. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientific schools NSh-6452.2014.6.

‘Economic giant, political dwarf!’ — ‘The EU does not get its act together’ — ‘The capability-expectation gap is widening’ (on the latter see Hill, 1993; for a most recent criticism of the EU’s inability to develop a coherent foreign policy see Howorth, 2010). These are only a few of the many indictments of the European Union’s (EU) foreign and security policy to be found in the editorials, but also occasionally in the scholarly literature. And yet it moves! As Daniel Thomas writes in this volume (ch.1), there have been more than 1,000 common strategies, common positions, and joint actions under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since 1993 and more than 2,000 foreign policy statements by the EU Council and Presidency between 1995 and 2008. In other words, cooperation on foreign policy matters is the rule rather than the exception in the EU — and the empirical case studies in this volume document it in detail. They show beyond doubt that the EU has emerged as a foreign policy actor which pursues rather coherent foreign policies — if it wants to and if the conditions are right. Thus, the EU’s actorness in foreign and security policy matters is no longer in question (see Sjursen, 2006). This is the first good news about this volume. It could be stated even more loudly and more clearly — particularly in light of the bad press that the EU’s foreign policy got recently in the context of Catherine Ashton’s appointment as EU ‘foreign minister’ (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to be precise) and the turbulent negotiations surrounding the European External Action Service (EEAS).

In Japan, there are various ministries and agencies that are involved in economic cooperation, but it is the Foreign Ministry which coordinates all the necessary elements. Japan sees this economic cooperation as one of the major pillars of its international contribution, hence we have integrated foreign aid policy into the broader perspectives of our overall foreign policy. We have been fortunate enough to be able to garner support and understanding from the Japanese public in conducting our Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japan started its activity in this field 40 years ago, joining in the framework of the Colombo Plan, through which technical cooperation began. Japan also started economic cooperation activities to make reparation to Asian countries after World War II. We have been carrying out a wide variety of aid activities, which are categorized into three schemes; namely: grant assistance for basic human needs, such as education and health; technical cooperation for human resources development; and the so-called 'yen loans', for the construction of economic and social infrastructures. The total volume of Japan's official development assistance in 1992 was US$11.15 billion, which was the largest among donor countries. About a quarter of it was distributed through international organizations, about 40% as loan aid, 15% as grant aid and 20% as technical cooperation (see Figures 1 and 2). The yen loan projects are picked up and decided by the Foreign Ministry, together with the Ministry of Finance and other ministries, and then the loan is provided by OECF, an implementation agency for yen loans. Grant assistance projects are picked up and decided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and implemented directly by the Foreign Ministry. As for technical cooperation, again, projects are picked up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) implements them. Recipients of Japan's ODA now include more than 150 countries and territories all over the world (see Figure 3). Of these, the largest recipient at present is Indonesia, the second China and the third is the Philippines. I had the chance to visit Indonesia and the Philippines this February, as the deputy head of a high-level mission on Economic and Technical Cooperation, to conduct a policy dialogue about Japan's assistance. Figure 3 shows some aspects of Japan's cooperation. Yen loans have contributed to 31% of Indonesia's electric power and 12% of its railways, 20% of Thailand's electric power, including the electrification of 12,000 villages, 5% of the Philippines' electric power and drinking water for 8.2 million

This research seeks to explore how the vast GCC sovereign wealth funds (SWF) can provide a vehicle for the development of the foreign security policy of these countries using constructivist paradigm. Although mostly small in sizes except for Saudi Arabia, the GCC countries with their extensive energy wealth are gradually becoming major players on the world stage. This was especially highlighted during the 2007-08 international financial crisis when GCC countries were visited by Western politicians requesting their assistance in bailing out failing financial institutions especially American banks. Gulf Cooperation Council sovereign wealth funds took the initiatives to invest in these failing Western financial institutions without much guarantee about returns on their investments which can be interpreted in different ways. Firstly, it could be interpreted as an effort to support the United States for example for its security guarantee or secondly as a means for these countries to gain influence (Behrendt, 2008). The increasing level of GCC sovereign wealth funds constituting at least 40% of global SWF and their reach in investments globally signal increased geopolitical meaning. However, the fund managers and the countries they originate have indicated that their investments are business transactions intended for purposes such as future generation and pension funds. Bahgat (2011) however indicates that GCC's SWF could have some foreign and security policy undertone. Over the years GCC countries have developed their security and foreign policies based on ‘bandwagoning’ realist paradigm in which the United States or the United Kingdom serve as proxy protector from challenges within and without. With some of the highest spending on their military and the changes in the political dynamics with globalisation and their own development, GCC countries while maintaining their ‘bandwagoning’ policies, have been emboldened by their wealth and military capability in term of military hardware. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (2013) in seeking to clarify the GCC foreign and security policies in this new era indicates that it is complex realism because it provides a means for the countries of the GCC to continue to seek the protection of their Western allies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom while also flexing their own muscle. It is for this reason that Young (2015:15) asserts that the current foreign policy direction of the GCC is punctuated by the ‘balancing of realist concerns for state power and survival with domestic environments accommodating diverse constituents and structural considerations of the international systems’. Young (2013) also indicates that the GCC has change direction in its foreign and security policies to become interventionist. Intervention in Bahrain during the Arab Spring of 2011 as well as recent intervention in Yemen shows the changes that have come to mark the GCC. The deduction from the above discourse on GCC's foreign and security policy is that it has always been assessed using positivist approaches which fail to reconcile agency and structure issues in the foreign and security policy making. The use of constructivist methods in this work from the point of view of sovereign wealth funds provides means of exploring various themes both from agency and structure. In other words, how does the institutions and the policy makers affect GCC foreign and security policy making? Key Words: Development, GCC, SWF, Security, Foreign Policy.

This article examines changes in the structure and operation of the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) after the collapse of communism through its entry into the European Union. Like all foreign ministries, the MFA must adapt to the changing nature of diplomacy, where the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy has become increasingly blurred. The MFA must compete in a more crowded foreign policy-making environment. However, the MFA has also been transformed by the collapse of communism. The ministry has been purged and forced to reevaluate its operations, goals, and institutional culture. This article evaluates the success of the MFA in meeting these significant challenges, and compares these reforms to the reforms of other ministries in the Czech Republic and other foreign ministries.

No More Passing: Japan’s Foreign Policy in Interesting Times Kevin Cooney (bio) In my interviews with Japanese foreign policy decision-makers in the late 1990s and again in the mid-2000s, I found an almost single-minded focus on the purpose of Japanese foreign policy. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) were particularly noteworthy in this regard. Of the officials interviewed, who ranged from some of the most senior to fairly junior, they almost unanimously answered that the goals of Japanese foreign policy were “the safety and prosperity of the nation.” When probed for specifics, these officials had difficulty giving any and tended to repeat the same mantra, “the safety and prosperity of the nation.” This national goal seemed to be drilled into career MOFA bureaucrats as the raison d’être of their jobs. For the Japanese foreign policy community, this goal has kept Japan on track in a changing world and has permitted it to focus on purpose-driven outcomes. When rapid changes occur, tangible policy goals can be changed quickly because they no longer serve the nation. For example, the safety and prosperity of the nation at one time may have been served by the pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat—a tangible goal that Japan has long had but is no longer pursuing as actively as it once did because this goal no longer seems as necessary. There are other paths to the safety and prosperity of the nation, given current global circumstances, like through a closer relationship with U.S. leadership. The overall result is that Japanese foreign policy is becoming more adept at adapting to sudden changes in the global foreign and security policy environment. This essay examines Japan’s ability to adapt quickly to radical changes in global leadership and traditional foreign policy norms that have left other nations adrift and confused. It concludes that a purpose-driven foreign policy is more likely to aid and guide the nation in a strange and interesting policy environment than one driven by tangible goals. Adapting to Change In the late 1980s, Japan was on top of the world. Its economy was second globally, only behind that of the United States, and was rising. Scholars such [End Page 24] as Paul Kennedy predicted that Japan would overtake the United States as the next global hegemon.1 Then came the sudden and unexpected end to the Cold War in 1989, followed by the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in 1991 and over two decades of recession, deflation, and economic stagnation. In the late 1990s, Japanese foreign policy experts argued that Japan was experiencing a phenomenon that they called “Japan passing,” in which the country was being passed over as no longer relevant.2 However, the 2000s brought a new special relationship between the United States and Japan, thanks to the personal connection between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. This highly personal approach to foreign policy has continued under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Donald Trump. Key to Japan’s success has been the ability to recognize change and quickly adapt to it, plus the luck of circumstances. In 2001, Koizumi came to power in Japan a few months after Bush entered office. Whereas Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton, saw eight Japanese prime ministers during his eight years in office, Koizumi served almost concurrently with Bush. The relationship between these two heads of state was aided by the fact that when the September 11 attacks occurred, the Japanese national security team was meeting in a late-night session to deal with a typhoon that was about to hit Japan. Koizumi thus was able to be the first world leader to pick up the phone and offer the United States sympathy and assistance. The Koizumi-Bush relationship, cemented by this phone call, transformed the bilateral relationship overnight. As one MOFA official told me in the summer of 2005 when asked about the status of the relationship, “It is the best ever!”3 Fast-forward to November 9, 2016, when Japan woke up to the surprise victory of Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the U.S. presidential election...

This chapter takes stock of “the common” in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Doing so, the chapter analyses the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) both in terms of institutions and substantive policies. Showing how European Union (EU) foreign policies after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty have partially been crafted without the necessary institutional consolidation, it sheds light on the many policy challenges that EU diplomacy is confronted with. Cases that this chapter analyses by way of illustration are policies in reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” and the transnational war in Syria, the EU’s foreign policy performance at the Iran nuclear talks, and the impact of the “Ukraine crisis” on both the EU’s foreign policy manoeuvrability and the perception thereof in other parts of the world. Likewise, the 2015 refugee crisis has become a stress test for common foreign policy responses, and will therefore be assessed in its impact on the perception of EU foreign policy. Finally, the chapter also touches upon the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its intricate interplay between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures and EU autonomous defence instruments. The European Union’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it will be argued, hinges on its ability to both formulate common strategies and policies internally, and to hold such policies up in the face of third parties in order to see such European foreign policies implemented beyond declaratory rhetoric.