Abstract
A verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme with sequential communication was proposed recently. In this work, we analyze its security and then give two new participant attacks. Using the first participant attack, the first participant can obtain the dealer's secrets by himself with nonzero probability without being detected. Using the second participant attack, a dishonest participant can gain access to the dealer's secrets by himself in the secret reconstruction phase while he can make the other participants recover false secrets instead of the real ones without being detected. Furthermore, we present an effective way to prevent these attacks.
Highlights
Threshold secret sharing scheme is a basic cryptographic primitive, in which a secret s is divided into n shares such that any t of the n shares can be used to reconstruct the secret s, but any set of t − 1 or fewer shares contains absolutely no information on the secret s [1]
To deal with the possible deception from the dealer, Chor et al firstly introduced the concept of verifiable secret sharing in 1985 [2], which satisfies all the requirements of secret sharing and allows each agent of the secret to verify that the share is consistent with the other shares [3]
Various verifiable quantum secret sharing schemes have been proposed [18]–[21], which provide a new mechanism for detecting the cheat of the dishonest agent who submits a fake share during the secret reconstruction phase, or checking the consistency of the reconstruction secret
Summary
Threshold secret sharing scheme is a basic cryptographic primitive, in which a secret s is divided into n shares such that any t of the n shares can be used to reconstruct the secret s, but any set of t − 1 or fewer shares contains absolutely no information on the secret s [1]. Various verifiable quantum secret sharing schemes have been proposed [18]–[21], which provide a new mechanism for detecting the cheat of the dishonest agent who submits a fake share during the secret reconstruction phase, or checking the consistency of the reconstruction secret. We analyze the security of the verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme [22] and give two new participant attacks. Let us give a brief description of the verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme with sequential communication [22], which includes both the classical. By the way of Shamir’s secret sharing, the dealer distributes n classical private shares to n agents Bob, Bob2, . . ., Bobn, respectively
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