Abstract
Recently, Shen et al. proposed an improvement on Yang-Shieh’s timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards. Then they claimed that their scheme cannot withstand a forged login attack, but also eliminate a problem of Yang-Shieh’s. However, their scheme is still susceptible to forged login attack. In this paper, we show how the forged login attack can be worked out on Shen et al.’s scheme and present an enhancement to resolve such a problem.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
