Security of Pacemakers using Runtime Verification

Abstract

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently recalled approximately 465,000 pacemakers that were vulnerable to hacking. It was reported that hackers could either pace the devices rapidly inducing arrhythmia or could drain the battery. Such actions would compromise the health and well being of the patient concerned. Considering this, techniques to ensure the security of implantable medical devices is an emerging area of research. To the best of our knowledge, existing techniques lack the formal rigour for ensuring the safety and security of such systems. While methods exist for formal verification of pacemaker software, these are not suitable to prevent security vulnerabilities. To this end we develop a run-time verification based approach. Our approach proposes a wearable device that non-invasively senses the familiar ECG signals in order to determine if a pacemaker has been compromised. We develop a set of timed policies to be monitored at run-time. We provide a methodology for the design of the wearable device and results demonstrate the technical feasibility of the developed concept.