Security is going to work: Everyday geographies, organizational traps, and the public administration of anti-terrorism policy

Abstract

Terrorism scholars have theorized excessive social control in response to post-9/11 expansive security structures. This literature is not, however, informed by the perspectives of public safety officials. Drawing on interviews with 27 public safety officials in Boston, MA conducted in 2008 and 2013 after the marathon bombing, I argue that one reason officials do not challenge social control issues is because of an organizational trap rooted in geographies of place. Organizational traps are theorized within public administration, and refer to institutional cultures that prevent needed change. I demonstrate that some of these traps are rooted in perceptions of geography beyond the institutional culture, and in the case of anti-terrorism policy, can result in much needed community engagement when disrupted. I provide three policy recommendations: (1) incorporate community sentiments about place into policy; (2) embrace expansive spatial identities; and (3) link security efforts with community geographies.