Abstract
The paper examines the optimal innovation of securities by an issuer who is endowed with several risky assets and private information on one of the assets. Assuming that the degree of asymmetric information between the issuer and the outside investor is large, we show that the issuer restricts the number of securities that he creates. We also show that the payoff of the security created by the issuer is not closely correlated, and is sometimes completely uncorrelated, with the payoff of the asset that is subject to the asymmetric information, depending on the hedging needs and the accuracy of information. JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D82, G20.
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