Security in the Persian Gulf: Perils and Opportunities

Abstract

The toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 has drastically altered the strategic and security landscape in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. This article examines Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi security perceptions of and policies towards their immediate shared region following the American invasion. It argues that despite other changes, their policies are still driven more by national interests and less by ideological orientations. The argument is three-fold. First, Iraq is likely to be a passive player in the emerging regional security system with a minimal role in shaping the regional security environment. Instead, developments in Baghdad are likely to be influenced by the cooperation/rivalry between other regional and international powers. Second, ideology remains an important determinant of the Iranian and Saudi foreign policies, but, contrary to much professional speculation, these policies are and will continue to be driven less by ideological orientations and more by realist national interests. Third, in the long run, however, deepening sectarian strife will further destabilize the region and threaten Western interests. Accordingly, the Persian Gulf policies of United States and other global actors should seek above all to contain sectarian division in Iraq and throughout the region. The most promising approach is inclusive, including an understanding between Washington and Tehran, as well as serious efforts to make peace with Israel, to enhance the prospects for regional stability and world peace.