Abstract
Many sensitive data are generated by resource-limitation devices in the Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). When these data are divulged, people 's life and property will be threatened. To solve these problems, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol based on RSA assumption for VANET and they claimed that their protocol was secure and low overhead. In this paper, first of all, we show that the basic signature scheme to be used in Wei et al.'s protocol is not secure, i.e., the user's private key will be revealed from the pairs of message-signatures, which causes the protocol to be insecure. We also show that our security analysis is feasible and effective in practice from the theory and experiments. Then we construct a new identity-based signature scheme based RSA assumption and prove it is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack without random oracle. Finally, we update the Wei et al.'s protocol and do some experiments to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme in the updated protocol.
Highlights
The internet of things(IoT) is a future network that connects everything [2]
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE identitybased signature (IBS) SCHEME In the subsection, we show how an adversary A uses the common modulus attack to forge a valid signature for the IBS scheme constructed by Wei et al [1]
If gcd( ̇, . . . , ̇) = 1 holds, it requires to a large number of signatures which exceeds the limitation of the number of the queries, the common modulus attack for the IBS scheme [1] is difficult to implement in practice
Summary
The internet of things(IoT) is a future network that connects everything [2]. Unlike traditional internet made up of computers, various hardware devices, sensors and computers are connected to form the network in the IoT with the development of communication technology and wireless technology. We analyze the impact of the security defect in the IBS on the protocol [1] and find that an RSU node can get the private keys of the OBU nodes with which it communicates through the common modulus attack. According to the security model of IBS scheme, after the adversary A receives the challenge identity id∗, it can continue to query signatures of some messages. It randomly chooses some messages m1, . ̇) = 1 holds, it requires to a large number of signatures which exceeds the limitation of the number of the queries, the common modulus attack for the IBS scheme [1] is difficult to implement in practice. The results show that it is very easy to implement the common modulus attack for the protocol in practice
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