Abstract
We address a three-period model of fi nancial intermediaries that involves securitization of risky loan assets, leverage, and asymmetric information. We show that the risk retention requirement with a fi xed ratio, stipulated by the Dodd-Frank Act, might induce losses of social welfare in the sense that a bank might not utilize pro fitable investment opportunities due to the regulation, which leads to a downward jump in social welfare. Furthermore, we present various structures of social welfare with respect to the level of skin in the game, and clarify the necessity of countercyclical regulation by verifying that the social losses of the current regulation become more severe during recession.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
