Securing IoT Transactions Against Double-Spending Attacks based on Signaling Game Approach

Abstract

With considerable demand for higher throughput, greater capacity, and lower latency for consumers, the Internet of Things (IoT) network is anticipated to meet the desired security and privacy requirements. This study provides high transaction throughput on critical IoT applications, particularly Bitcoin security against double-spending attacks. To this end, we investigated the signaling game approach to model the interaction between two miners while considering players behavior (malicious or honest miners) and the incoming transaction throughput. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that exploits the signaling game to cover the incoming transactions randomness waiting for validation, which influences the honest miners behavior. With extensive simulations, we show that our proposed signaling game reduces the impact of double-spending attacks on IoT transactions. The results also illustrate the benefit of using the signaling game to model the interaction between two miners while handling the incomplete information of the incoming transactions and the type of miners.