Abstract

Despite the many conveniences of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, the underlying open architecture for communication between the RFID devices may lead to various security threats. Recently, many solutions were proposed to secure RFID systems and many such systems are based on only lightweight primitives, including symmetric encryption, hash functions, and exclusive OR operation. Many solutions based on only lightweight primitives were proved insecure, whereas, due to resource-constrained nature of RFID devices, the public key-based cryptographic solutions are unenviable for RFID systems. Very recently, Gope and Hwang proposed an authentication protocol for RFID systems based on only lightweight primitives and claimed their protocol can withstand all known attacks. However, as per the analysis in this article, their protocol is infeasible and is vulnerable to collision, denial-of-service (DoS), and stolen verifier attacks. This article then presents an improved realistic and lightweight authentication protocol to ensure protection against known attacks. The security of the proposed protocol is formally analyzed using Burrows Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and under the attack model of automated security verification tool ProVerif. Moreover, the security features are also well analyzed, although informally. The proposed protocol outperforms the competing protocols in terms of security.

Highlights

  • Since its inception, the Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging idea and is defined as, “A system of interrelated computing devices, mechanical and digital machines, objects, animals, or people that are provided with unique identifiers (UIDs) and the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction” [1]

  • A legitimate Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag can form a valid request message M1, including both these parameters, as valid AIDTi is only known to legal tag; IDT, Kts are known to the legal tag only

  • The proposed protocol does not reveal any login information of the current of or any previous sessions that lead to a security attack on the RFID system

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Summary

A Robust Authentication Protocol Using

Khwaja Mansoor 1,† , Anwar Ghani 2,† , Shehzad Ashraf Chaudhry 3,† , Shahaboddin Shamshirband 4,5, *,† , Shahbaz Ahmed Khan Ghayyur 2,† and Amir Mosavi 6,7,†.

Introduction
Motivations and Contributions
Adversarial Model
Road Map
Review of Baseline Protocol
Baseline Protocol Tag Registration Phase
Baseline Protocol Tag Authentication Phase
Vulnerable to Collision Attack
Vulnerable to Stolen Verifier Attack
Vulnerable to DoS Attack
Proposed Scheme
Tags Registration Phase
Tags Authentication Phase
Security Analysis
BAN Logic-Based Formal Security Analysis
Security Analysis with ProVerif
Mutual Authentication Between Tag And Server
Anonymity
Traceability
Scalability
Collision Attack
DoS Attack
Replay Attacks
Location Tracking Attack
3.3.11. Stolen-Verifier Attacks
Comparative Analysis
Security Requirements
Computation Cost Analysis
Communication and Storage Cost Analysis
Conclusions
Full Text
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