Abstract
The pilot contamination attack is one kind of active eavesdropping activities conducted by a malicious user during the channel training phase. In the existing physical layer transmission against such attack, it is usually assumed that the transmitters may obtain prior knowledge to identify the legitimate users first, then design secure scheme based on the corrected main channel information. However, sometimes it is likely that the prior knowledge is not available, which makes it more difficult to design the transmitting scheme. Motivated by this, we propose a novel transmission against the pilot contamination attack. In our scheme, it is assumed that ideal prior knowledge of the main channel state information (CSI) is not available. Additionally, an extra assistant node is introduced to the well-known Wyner eavesdropping model. Both the uncorrected main CSI and the CSI at the assistant node are used to design the random scrambling scheme at the transmitter, which means there is no need to differentiate between eavesdroppers and legitimate users. Furthermore, we discuss the receiving performance of legitimate users cooperated with the assistant node. Numerical results shows that the legitimate users could achieve pleasant receiving performance while eavesdroppers could hardly obtain acceptable recovery of the original signal.
Published Version
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