Abstract
In recent years, wireless technologies have gained enormous popularity and used vastly in a variety of applications. Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are temporary networks which are built for specific purposes; they do not require any pre-established infrastructure. The dynamic nature of these networks makes them more utilizable in ubiquitous computing. These autonomous systems of wireless mobile nodes can be set up anywhere and anytime. However, due to high mobility, absence of centralized authority and open media nature, MANETs are more vulnerable to various security threats. As a result, they are prone to more security issues as compared to the traditional networks. Ad hoc networks are highly susceptible to various types of attacks. Sequence number attacks are such hazardous attacks which greatly diminish the performance of the network in different scenarios. Sequence number attacks suck some or all data packets and discard them. In past few years, various researchers proposed different solutions for detecting the sequence number attacks. In this paper, first we review notable works done by various researchers to detect sequence number attacks. The review thoroughly presents distinct aspects of the proposed approach. In addition, we propose a proactive predictive approach to mitigate sequence number attacks which discovers misbehaving nodes during route discovery phase. The proposed approach suggests modifications in Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol.
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