Secure Positioning in Wireless Sensor Networks through Enlargement Miscontrol Detection

Abstract

Wireless sensor networks enable a wealth of new applications in areas such as military, medical, environmental, transportation, smart city, and so on. In many of these scenarios, we need to measure in a secure way the positions of the sensors. Existing range-based techniques for secure positioning require a burdensome infrastructure, with many fixed anchors. Reducing the infrastructure would reduce deployment cost and foster the adoption of secure positioning solutions in wireless sensor networks. In this article, we propose SPEM, a secure positioning system based on multilateration and ultra-wideband (UWB) distance bounding protocols. The key idea behind SPEM is to leverage the low probability that an adversary has of controlling enlargement attacks against UWB. We estimate such a probability by a thorough study and signal-level simulations of the UWB physical layer. We test SPEM both in a simulated environment and in a real indoor environment using real UWB transceivers. We show that SPEM needs far less infrastructure than state-of-the-art solutions ( − 22% to − 93%, depending on the anchor deployment method), while achieving high levels of security against smart and determined adversaries.