Abstract

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks for the remote control and operation of various industrial infrastructures are currently being used as main metropolitan infrastructures, especially smart grid and power plants. Most of the existing SCADA networks have fortified securities because of their powerful access control based on closed and private networks. However, recent SCADA networks are frequently connected to various IT-based systems and also to other conventional networks, in order to achieve the operational convenience of SCADA systems, as well as the execution requirements of various applications. Therefore, SCADA systems have acute needs for secure countermeasures against the ordinary network vulnerabilities and for tangible preparations against ever-changing intrusion attacks such as advanced persistent threat (APT). This paper introduces the concept of m-connected SCADA networks, analyzes various security vulnerabilities on such networks, and finally proposes an integrated secure model having an APT managing module and a rule-based intrusion detection system (IDS) for internal and external network access.

Highlights

  • Most of the major core infrastructures, including power supply chains, are managed and operated through the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system

  • SCADA networks that typically operate within a closed network have recently been connected to several intranets, extranets, and other devices in order to achieve operational effectiveness and convenience; the security of SCADA network cannot be guaranteed anymore by just using its isolation property

  • Because of several advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, damage has been reported for the control systems of largescale organizations, including nuclear power plants under

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Summary

Introduction

Most of the major core infrastructures, including power supply chains, are managed and operated through the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The SCADA system which was allowed to operate in a closed private network disconnected from the Internet for not being a victim to cyber danger strongly requires various types of external connections along with remote maintenance and usage of mobile storage mediums such as USB flash memory. Such an environmental change means that the securities of the SCADA system, which are rooted in the characteristics of closed networks, can no longer be maintained [3]. This paper includes our initial research result published in [3] and gives more detailed explanations and elaborations onto it

Related Work
Security of m-Connected SCADA Network
Secure Model for m-Connected SCADA Networks
Conclusions
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