Secure I-Voting System with Modified Voting and Verification Protocol

Abstract

Internet voting has been used in the countries like UK, Estonia, Switzerland, etc. In the i-voting protocol used in Estonia, the full security of the vote cast relies only on the PIN stored in the national ID card. In the i-voting protocol used in Estonia, the vote cast is encrypted by the public key of the vote storage server and digitally signed by using the PIN2 of the voter. The attacker can easily re-vote by using Re-voting Malware and can cast vote of any voter by using Self-voting Malware. To overcome the attack, we modified the voting protocol by including an OTP which should be sent to the voter’s phone number. The voter should enter the OTP to cast the vote so the attacker cannot bluff the voter. The vote modification malware changes the vote cast by the voter according to the preference of attacker, and the vote change should not be reflected in the vote verification application. To overcome the attack, the vote verification protocol is modified by digitally signed the vote by using the private key of the server. We analyse the major client-side attacks on the proposed i-voting system and found that it is more secure than the i-voting system used in Estonia.