Abstract
We introduce a novel method for secure computation of biometric hash on dynamic hand signatures using BioPhasor mixing and 2N discretization. The use of BioPhasor as the mixing process provides a one-way transformation that precludes exact recovery of the biometric vector from compromised hashes and stolen tokens. In addition, our user-specific 2N discretization acts both as an error correction step as well as a real-to-binary space converter. We also propose a new method of extracting compressed representation of dynamic hand signatures using discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and discrete fourier transform (DFT). Without the conventional use of dynamic time warping, the proposed method avoids storage of user's hand signature template. This is an important consideration for protecting the privacy of the biometric owner. Our results show that the proposed method could produce stable and distinguishable bit strings with equal error rates (EERs) of 0% and 9.4% for random and skilled forgeries for stolen token (worst case) scenario, and 0% for both forgeries in the genuine token (optimal) scenario.
Highlights
There is a growing interest in applying biometric for authentication, especially in deriving compact representation of the biometric for cryptographic uses or as encryption keys
From our experiments, we found that the Daubechies 6 (DB6) mother wavelet with decomposition level 2 and compression rate of
We believe that the proposed integration of BioPhasor random mixing and user-specific 2N discretization is a secure method for deriving biometric hashes from dynamic hand signatures without jeopardizing the privacy of the user
Summary
There is a growing interest in applying biometric for authentication, especially in deriving compact representation of the biometric for cryptographic uses or as encryption keys. Existing methods of extractions typically require the storage of the template hand signature signals This is because a template signal is needed to adjust nonlinear variations in the input hand signature signals. A few variations exist for the storage of user templates: (1) use of tamper-proof cards and (2) centralized server. The former which normally requires some form of PIN or password for access permission to the template is not secure as the PIN is meant to be memorized and is short and easy to be guessed. In the event of key compromise, a new key would be reissued using another random token but not the biometric
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