Abstract

In the recent COVID-19 situation, Telecare Medical Information System (TMIS) is attracting attention. TMIS is one of the technologies used in Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) and can provide patients with a variety of remote healthcare services. In TMIS environments, sensitive data of patients are communicated via an open channel. An adversary may attempt various security attacks including impersonation, replay, and forgery attacks. Therefore, numberous authentication schemes have been suggested to provide secure communication for TMIS. Sahoo <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> proposed a mutual authentication scheme based on biometrics and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in 2020. However, we find out that Sahoo <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> ’s scheme cannot resist insider and privileged insider attacks and cannot guarantee patient anonymity. In this paper, we propose a secure ECC-based three-factor mutual authentication protocol that guarantees the privacy of patients for TMIS. We conduct informal security analysis to prove that our protocol is secure from various security attacks. In addition, we perform formal security analyses using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA), Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, and the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model. Furthermore, we assess our protocol’s performance and compare it to other protocols. As a result, our protocol has lower communication costs, and better security features compared to related existing protocols. Therefore, our protocol is more appropriate for TMIS environments than other related protocols.

Highlights

  • I N the recent COVID-19 situation, people are increasingly interested in remote services to avoid contact with others

  • We propose a secure Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based three-factor mutual authentication protocol that guarantees the privacy of patients for Telecare Medical Information System (TMIS)

  • We propose a secure ECC-based three-factor mutual authentication protocol for TMIS using a mobile device of patients

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

I N the recent COVID-19 situation, people are increasingly interested in remote services to avoid contact with others. J. Ryu et al.: Secure ECC-based Three-Factor Mutual Authentication Protocol for Telecare Medical Information System reduce time and cost consumption and utilize the various healthcare services at home. Ryu et al.: Secure ECC-based Three-Factor Mutual Authentication Protocol for Telecare Medical Information System reduce time and cost consumption and utilize the various healthcare services at home Because of these benefits, TMIS provides more suitable healthcare services than existing faceto-face healthcare in the COVID-19 situation. To protect sensitive patient data, their protocol utilizes biometric information, symmetric cryptography, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) They claimed that their protocol can withstand a variety of security attacks including stolen smartcards, offline password guessing, and replay attacks. We propose a secure ECC-based three-factor mutual authentication protocol for TMIS using a mobile device of patients

RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
RELATED WORK
BIOHASHING
LOGIN PHASE
AUTHENTICATION PHASE
PROPOSED PROTOCOL
FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING ROR MODEL
FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING AVISPA
COMPUTATION COSTS
CONCLUSION

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