Abstract

Mobile device pairing inside vehicles is a ubiquitous task which requires easy to use and secure solutions. In this work we exploit the audio-video domain for pairing devices inside vehicles. In principle, we rely on the widely used elliptical curve version of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol and extract the session keys from the acoustic domain as well as from the visual domain by using the head unit display. The need for merging the audio-visual domains first stems from the fact that in-vehicle head units generally do not have a camera so they cannot use visual data from smartphones, however, they are equipped with microphones and can use them to collect audio data. Acoustic channels are less reliable as they are more prone to errors due to environmental noise. However, this noise can be also exploited in a positive way to extract secure seeds from the environment and audio channels are harder to intercept from the outside. On the other hand, visual channels are more reliable but can be more easily spotted by outsiders, so they are more vulnerable for security applications. Fortunately, mixing these two types of channels results in a solution that is both more reliable and secure for performing a key exchange.

Highlights

  • Introduction and Related WorkPairing smart mobile devices inside modern vehicles has become a common task

  • The encrypted information and the value of bP are embedded in a QR code which is displayed on the screen

  • The designed solution shows that a secure Diffie-Hellman key-exchange can be efficiently performed between smartphones and in-vehicle head units in the audio domain

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Summary

Introduction and Related Work

Pairing smart mobile devices inside modern vehicles has become a common task. Due to the increased number of mobile devices that a user carries, e.g., smartphones, smartwatches, etc., finding a fast and efficient solution for secure associations is an immediate goal. As an additional means to increase security, we use the in-vehicle noise to bootstrap security bits in the generation of the elliptical curve point P which is necessary for the guessing-resilient authenticated key-agreement protocol SPEKE described in [5]. This protocol was later analyzed in [6] and is known to be secure. We try a second protocol version in which the visual channel is replaced by an audio channel, but due to the higher error rate this solution seems less preferable and more suitable when pairing two smartphones rather than an infotainment unit and a smartphone.

Context and Related Work
Ghz and 5 Ghz
Experimental Devices and Methodology for Audio Key Extraction
Software Implementation
Protocol
Computational Requirements and Implementation of SPEKE
Test Scenarios and Results
In-Door Experiments with Smartphones
In-Vehicle Experiments with Smartphones
In-Vehicle Experiments with Smartphones and Head Unit
Conclusions
Full Text
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