Secularization: A Cross-National Study of Catholic Male Adolescents

Abstract

Secularization is the object of controversy and unclarity. By restricting the concept to traditional forms of religiosity, and by distinguishing it multidimensionally, similar to Glock This content downloaded from 207.46.13.103 on Thu, 20 Oct 2016 04:06:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms SECULARIZATION OF CATHOLIC ADOLESCENTS 29 and Stark's model of religious commitment, it can be fruitfully applied. A priori hypotheses predicting increases in secularization based on differences in urbanization and industrialization from samples of Catholic male adolescents in Merida, San Juan, St. Paul, and New York are partially confirmed, and the need for a multidimensional concept of secularization is underscored. A suggested expansion of the concept would include vocabularies of motives, e.g., Anglo respondents checked parental expectations as reasons for attending church considerably more than did the Latin respondents. Caution is in order, however, when applying data from a cross-sectional design to theories of change. A recurrent theme in contemporary sociological and theological writing is the increasing secularization of society (Berger, 1967a; Glock, 1965; O'Dea, 1966; Stark and Glock, 1968). Recently, however, Greeley (1969) argues that the secularization thesis is not proven. In fact he insists that the best current data do not support it. The present study addresses itself to this question. Part of the controversy revolves around problematic and occasionally ideological definitions of the term secularization. It is, unfortunately, used ambiguously to refer to the enervation of religious symbols, the weakening of religious motivations, the decline of religious institutions, or the emergence of a dominant a-religious or anti-religious scientific world view which renders religious rationalizations obsolete (Shiner, 1967). Martin (1965) finds the term so misleading that it ought to be dropped. With clear specification, however, secularization can be a fruitful and nonideological concept for research. THEORETICAL RATIONALE For the task of the present paper, the first specification is that the concept be used in a strict sense to refer to the decline of traditional forms of religiosity, and thus avoid the insoluble debate whether religiosity as such is declining. The second specification is that secularization be operationalized as a differentiated concept at the micro level of behavior, e.g., along Weberian dimensions (Pfautz, 1956:247; cf. O'Dea, 1966:81), viz., a decrease in affectual or emotional motivation and an increase in purposive-rational and social expectations or other-directed motivation in the area of religious behavior. In this sense, secularization implies changes within the structure of religious behavior itself. Thus we may speak of the secularization of religion as well as of society. This differentiated micro concept of secularization complements the multidimensional concept of religious commitment or religiosity, i.e., the constitutive dimensions of belief, experience, knowledge, and practice and the consequential dimension or effects of the preceding four dimensions (Demerath and Hammond, 1969; Glock and Stark, 1965). If secularization is used to refer to the decline in traditional forms of a multidimensional concept of religiosity, it is necessary to specify how each of the dimensions may be expected to change. Following the definition given above, it is posited a priori that secularization implies a shift in emphasis from religious belief and experience to knowledge and practice, as well as a decline in global traditional religiosity (a combination of belief, experience, knowledge and practice), and in the consequences of religiosity. The secularization of religiosity is conceived as resulting from the macro movement of modernization, which in turn is carried by the processes of urbanization and industrialization. These movements result in increasing differentiation (Bellah, 1964) and pluralization of symbolic worlds (Berger, 1967b) which eventually, though not necessarily immediately (Inkeles, 1968), weaken traditional forms of religious behavior. Secularization is therefore expected to be strongest in the industrialized cultures of the world and in large urban areas (cf. Lonski, 1963, for contrary indications). The macro processes of pluralization are assumed to have an impact on or affinity for secularized behavior at the micro level (Berger 1967a: 126, mentions subjective as well as structural secularization; cf. Luckmann, 1967; O'Dea, 1966). The present study, however, contains no intermediate or bridging concepts from the macro level * Gratitude is acknowledged for NSF grants 1806 and 2650, a Grant-in-Aid from Washington State University, and NIMH Fellowships. Professional support was receive.d from Murray Straus and Reuben Hill. We wish to thank Armand Mauss for a critical reading. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.103 on Thu, 20 Oct 2016 04:06:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms