Searle, Rationality, and Social Reality

Abstract

ABSTRACT . This paper makes a critical assessment of some contributions of John Searle of direct relevance to social science—his theory of rationality and his theory of institutions. The former is criticized for being able to account for how people can act for “external reasons,” as opposed to their desires, only in cases where an obligation derives from a promise; a rival account is much more general. The latter is criticized on three grounds: (1) his theory of institutions can only account for a narrow range of social reality, that deriving from some kind of “enactment”; (2) his notion of “collective intentionality” is unnecessary to explain institutions and is introduced only so that Searle can stay within an individualistic, Cartesian theory of the mind, something of no interest to social scientists; (3) his account implies that if an institution exists, “we collectively accept it,” whereas it may in fact not be accepted, but merely tolerated or submitted to.