Abstract

ABSTRACT The Indian Navy, since independence, has found it challenging to be militarily relevant as a valuable instrument of threat or use of force in India's military strategy. The Navy's fortunes, therefore, have depended far more on the inclinations of India's political leadership, the requirements of India's foreign policy priorities in its immediate neighborhood and the outlook of great powers operating in the Indian Ocean towards littoral navies. After the end of the Cold War, the increase in the Indian Navy's profile is indisputable, evident in its growing size, the diverse diplomatic and constabulary roles assigned to her but also the positive perception of the service as a stabilizing force in the Indian Ocean region by extra-regional powers such as the US and other Quad countries. China's encroachment in the Himalayas and the rising profile of the PLA-Navy has provided a startegic rationale for the Indian Navy to project itself as a vital instrument in India's military statecraft. By linking India's military objectives on the land border to the Navy's natural advantage and capabilities in the Indian Ocean, it aims to fundamentally alter its existential crisis as the most irrelevant arm of the Indian military. Yet, this newfound relevance remains doubtful under the inherent risks accompanying naval coercion and the shortage of resources.

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