Abstract

Contemporary American political science has dealt too little, too late (the late 1960's), and generally too weakly with the question of how wars end, Thies argues. Theorists of the 1950's-1960's are grouped into: limited war theorists, who tended to see warring nations on the analogy of rationally calculating individuals; those concerned with ending wars quickly; and those applying game theory to the Vietnam war. Thies carefully criticizes each approach. A fourth group is more sensitive to domestic political and bureaucratic considerations, but their work tends to focus on one side to the neglect of: the interaction between two sides required to end a war, and the assumptions of each side's leaders about the other side's intentions. The essay combines helpful analysis of the literature with knowledgeable commentary on the efforts to end the war in Vietnam. One hesitantly suggests that it may be useful next time.

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