SEA POWER

Abstract

SUMMARYConverting these theories of sea power into specific tasks for our own and our allied navies is no insurmountable problem. Priorities and emphasis upon tasks will, like land warfare, “depend upon the situation” but preparation to meet all of them can be made.If, as many military men aver, a third World War may be in essence won or lost in its initial phases, it will be the influence of sea power along lines which are developments of, not departures from, Mahan which will sway the balance to our favor. Time will always be necessary for the industrial power of the United States to develop the great land armies, the expanded Air Force required for complete victory. The U. S. Navy, with the help from land and air power available, is most nearly ready. Our task as a nation is to complete its preparation for its new role, to spearhead our national offense to the end that the costly backs‐to‐the‐wall duty of “first line of defense” need never be assumed.The demands of our policy in peace and of our strategy in war both require that we exploit the oceans of the world as highways, not cringe behind them as barriers. But neither the demands of peace nor the demands of war can be met unless we possess sea power in the broadest sense of the term. Seen in this proper perspective sea power emerges as the essential base of American policy.