SDN-ESRC: A Secure and Resilient Control Plane for Software-Defined Networks

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a resilient control plane based on endogenous security for Software-Defined Networking (SDN) named SDN-ESRC to prevent vulnerability backdoor attacks. SDN-ESRC uses a set of heterogeneous controllers (e.g., RYU, OpenDayLight, ONOS) to compose the control plane and dynamically and adaptively selects several heterogeneous controller instances from the controller set to detect and correct the malicious control messages. The design of SDN-ESRC faces two challenges: (1) increasing network update delay due to multi-controller comparison and (2) maintaining high controllable security. To address the first challenge, SDN-ESRC adopts the master modification mode to reduce the network update delay and identify malicious control messages. To address the second challenge, SDN-ESRC introduces the comparison modification mode to ensure high availability in real time. We propose an evaluation model for SDN-ESRC and theoretically analyze the SDN-ESRC’s endogenous security performance under three typical backdoor attack scenarios. We implement SDN-ESRC in a prototype system and conduct simulations and experiments. The results show that SDN-ESRC can improve the backdoor damage attack security up to 98.3%, the backdoor random attack security up to 99.99%, and the backdoor coordinated attack security up to 82% at the cost of increasing network update delay less than 8.3%.