SCRUTINIZE ME, PLEASE! THE DRIVERS, MANIFESTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY‐SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

Abstract

Voluntary accountability, where people and organizations willingly subject themselves to scrutiny, seems counterintuitive. The common understanding is that increased accountability has negative consequences for the accountor; and so why would anyone voluntarily seek accountability when it is not required? Current explanations hold that external pressures can explain accountability‐seeking behaviour, and the proponents are not convinced by the argument that it is beneficial to the accountor. In contrast, this study finds that accountability often serves the accountor's interests. A six‐part typology of accountor‐beneficial motivations is developed, the empirical adequacy of which is tested through extensive case studies. The results show that public accountability can be a means rather than a burden in the hands of political executive leaders. These findings challenge the conventional principal–agent understanding of accountability and suggest that the study of the poorly understood practice of democratic accountability would benefit from a more leader‐centric perspective.