Abstract
ABSTRACT Introduced in the 2000s as a component of social welfare reforms, the means test determines the eligibility of aid applicants based on previously set income categories. Replacing local committees that decided eligibility, this centralized and digitalized screening process rests on information infrastructures that are mostly invisible. This paper argues that the ways in which applicants contest the outcome of the means test, subvert the eligibility requirements, and go around the screening processes, make visible these otherwise-mostly invisible information infrastructures. Through a discussion of the contestations, subversions, and go-arounds applicants use (not always successfully) to receive emergency food relief from municipal food banks in Istanbul, the paper shows that these information infrastructures not only appear as if they are value-neutral and apolitical, but in so doing, they also serve as useful tools for obscuring who the actual decision makers are.
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