“Scrambling”: Logic of horizontal competition between local governments based on three cases of interprovincial disaster counterpart support

Abstract

Interprovincial counterpart support is a cooperative system used by local governments to achieve horizontal flow of resources based on cross-regional cooperation. Existing research has mainly focused on governance efficiency, institutional advantages, and ranking incentives while ignoring the scrambling behavior and operational mechanisms of local governments formed by ranking incentives and territorial responsibilities. This study selected the Wenchuan earthquake, Yushu earthquake, and COVID-19 as three typical cases. We constructed a theoretical framework for competition among provincial local governments and found that competition in interprovincial disaster counterpart support followed a dual behavioral logic of “striving to be first” and “fear of being last”. Specifically, local governments will choose striving to be first under the logic of time coercion, content games, and territorial responsibility; they will choose fear of being last under the logic of responsibility avoidance and moral pressure. This type of scrambling-based horizontal competition reflects the logic of local government competition tournaments. This study further revealed the specific processes, mechanisms, and results of horizontal local government competition, which can provide inspiration for cross-regional and provincial cooperation.