Abstract
In this paper, I will be concerned with the realist/anti-realist issue in the context of science, and I will be defending some version of scientific realism. The discussion will be conducted at the epistemological, and not the metaphysical, level. I will start from Kant's definition of reality as that which is connected with perception according to laws quoted by Hermann Weyl in his Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (1963, p. 122).1 Of course, the concepts of perception and law are at least as entangled as the notion of reality and Kant's definition, as it stands, is open to a wide variety of interpretations. I do not want here to enter in such a discussion, let alone in an exegetic debate about the meaning of reality in Kant's thought.
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