Abstract

Abstract The preceding chapter argued that the aim of science is the production of scientific knowledge. This chapter argues for the corresponding claim about scientific progress: scientific progress is the accumulation of scientific knowledge. This exemplifies the epistemic approach to progress, according to which an episode must meet certain epistemic standards for it to be progressive. This chapter contrasts this account with the views that hold that progress is increasing verisimilitude or increasing problem-solving power. These lack an epistemic element (at least when understood externalistically), which make progress too easy. This chapter also contrasts the cumulative knowledge account with the noetic account, which links progress to understanding, where the latter is taken to concern explanatory and predictive power. This view is over-demanding, since there are contributions to knowledge that do not involve addition of understanding (or explanatory or predictive power).

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