Scientific Ontology: Fact or Stance?

Stathis Psillos

doi:10.1017/s0012217320000360

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the concept of epistemic stance is scrutinized, noting that there are problems in Chakravartty's account of the rationality of stance-choice. Finally, Section 6 is about the implications of stance-based ontology for the scientific realism debate.

Highlights

In this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty’s book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed
The brief of the book is to discuss the nature of the philosophical commitment to scientific realism and to promote AC’s own view that the scope and limits of scientific ontology is a function of the prior adoption of an epistemic stance
AC tends to agree with the view that the scientific realism debate has reached an impasse and claims that the impasse is best understood as a conflict between different epistemic stances.[39]

Summary

Introduction

The key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty’s book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. I should note that, though I have defended and still defend Inference to the Best Explanation ( IBE) and explanation-based reasoning and inference in general), I have argued that IBE should be used with extra caution when it comes to cases concerning what I called above second-level ontological claims, viz., the level of the ontic categories that constitute the metaphysical blueprint of Being.

Results

Conclusion