Scientific Knowledge and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature

Abstract

In assessing the aesthetic value of nature, two issues loom large. From the point of view of some contemporary aestheticians, there is the question of whether, aesthetically speaking, nature offers anything like the depth, complexity, and meaningfulness of art. From the point of view of environmental philosophers, aesthetic value may be seen as a source of value that contributes to the overall value of nature, and as a further reason for its preservation. But aesthetic value can also be the enemy of the environmentalist: often decisions made on aesthetic grounds conflict with decisions made on preservationist grounds. Aesthetic considerations often favor preserving parts of nature that strike the eye, places like the Grand Canyon that might be described as grand or majestic, as opposed to areas with more mundane-looking views and features. Yet, the latter may be equally or more environmentally important. One way out of both difficulties is to accept a cognitive account of the appreciation of nature such as the one proposed by Allen Carlson. Carlson argues that scientific knowledge is necessary to correctly determine what categories objects of nature fall into. Drawing on Kendall Walton's well-known Categories of Art, he argues that just as aesthetically appreciating art requires knowledge of artistic traditions and styles that allow us to perceive works in categories, aesthetically appreciating nature requires knowledge of the different environments of nature and of its systems and elements.1 Carlson describes the relevant knowledge as that of natural science, ecology, natural history, and common sense.2 Scientific knowledge is required for the correct appreciation of objects insofar as appreciation involves an element of knowledge, but in categorizing nature, science also focuses our attention on relevant aspects of nature for appreciation.3 The importance of Carlson's cognitive model is clea , because it offers a response to the central worries raised above. Our aesthetic assessments take into consideration not only formal elements such as color and design, but also the role that an object plays within a system of nature. Thus the account allows for a complex, deep, and meanngfu a sthetic appreciation of nature. Further, with this deeper appreciation of nature, the seemingly mundane may become interesting, and facts about the environmental impact of certain species (for example) can affect our aesthetic appreciation. In this way, our aesthetic and ethical assessments of what ought to be preserved in nature may be more harmonious than previously thought. Carlson's model, while promising, has some seemingly obvious difficulties that have not been adequately addressed. First, there are criticisms that aim at showing that scientific knowledge is not required for the appreciation of (at least some) nature. People frequently appreciate natur without scientific knowledge, and, according to some, there is nothing wrong with these judgments. In other words, it does not take a rocket scientist to find a sunset beautiful.4 An-