Abstract
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.
Highlights
We hope that by inquiring together we may eventually discover the truth
The field of biology, say, has succeeded in its aim if it discovers the truth about biological systems, but what does this entail for how we evaluate individual papers published in biology journals? Should we say each of those must discover the truth about its particular topic matter? In general, if we are to make progress in collective inquiry, what do we require from the individual contributors?
We do not take a stand on whether the scientific conclusions should be held to be assertions or not, but we do claim that reflection upon why they are not held to typical norms of assertion is illuminating as to the general character of collective inquiry and the relationship its individual subcomponents must bear to the overall endeavour
Summary
We hope that by inquiring together we may eventually discover the truth. Or, failing that, at least to achieve some other epistemic aim—we shall assume it is truth from here on out, though nothing turns on that choice of aim in particular. As a way into the general question of how individual pieces of inquiry may contribute to a successful joint endeavour, we explore whether the utterances made by scientists when announcing their findings and results are held to any of these clusters of norms of assertion. We will find that such claims made about individual scientific contributions ought not be held to typical norms of assertion. We do not take a stand on whether the scientific conclusions should be held to be assertions or not, but we do claim that reflection upon why they are not held to typical norms of assertion is illuminating as to the general character of collective inquiry and the relationship its individual subcomponents must bear to the overall endeavour. We will give two different theoretical arguments for this: an argument from division of cognitive labour and an argument from the pessimistic meta-induction
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
