Scientific and Theological Realism

Abstract

In this paper I shall explore the parallels and contrasts between scientific and theological realism. I shall start by providing an outline of the various aspects of scientific realism before looking at these in more detail and in comparison to theological realism. I hope that by this comparison with the well-developed debates between various species of scientific antirealists and realists, that some light may be shed on debates concerning realism in theology. The term ‘scientific realism’ covers a variety of related positions. These may roughly be divided into the metaphysical and the epistemological. The former concerns the subject matter of science. The realist and antirealist may disagree on the correct answer to the question, ‘what is particle physics about?’ Since such questions may be couched in terms of the reference of the key terms of science, we may regard many of the important debates concerning realism as debates about the semantics of scientific terms. Epistemological realists and their opponents take positions on what we can and do know in science or on whether our scientific beliefs are justified. A third area that links with both parts of the realism debate concerns the question, ‘what is the aim of science?’ I shall briefly consider each of these three aspects of the scientific realism-antirealism debate before looking at the parallels in the theological realism-antirealism debate. My conclusion will be that metaphysical antirealism faces many obstacles both in science and theology. If anything the obstacles are greater in theology, even though antirealism is a popular option among theologians. Epistemological antirealism (scepticism, agnosticism, atheism) is better grounded, but in science there are strong responses that do not have theological parallels. Consequently, the theological metaphysical realist is threatened by epistemological antirealism.