Abstract

I Read with interest and sympathy the Editorial “Warming U.S.-Russia relations” (C. A. Campbell, 20 June, p. [1323][1]). I agree about the importance of science diplomacy, an endeavor to which I devoted over 40 years of my career in both the public and nonprofit sectors, specifically in the Soviet and post-Soviet space. However, I cannot agree that science diplomacy is on the level of a categorical imperative, trumping and contradicting critical U.S. foreign policy goals. ![Figure][2] PHOTO: TONG RO/THINKSTOCK We folks who love to talk about “science diplomacy” sometimes forget that “science” is an adjective qualifying the subject, which is “diplomacy.” Diplomacy, when funded as such by the U.S. government, is an expression of U.S. foreign policy. When policy-makers decide that our foreign policy must reflect our displeasure through serious sanctions against a country for clear violations of international norms and even outright aggression, then it is appropriate and reasonable for a broad range of government-funded programs under the diplomacy rubric to be affected. This can be very hard on the participants, both personally and professionally, especially those in the offending country, who often put themselves at considerable risk just by taking part in them. We all suffer when these or any other serious sanctions are imposed. That is the world in which we live, the world in which science lives, too. In terms of international science cooperation, we sometimes need to distinguish among public funds appropriated primarily to improve political relations with other countries (“science diplomacy”); public funds appropriated to support science itself (e.g., through the appropriations of the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, and other agencies); and the broad range of science cooperation that takes place without any public funds at all. Campbell notes that in the 1980s, the U.S. government terminated some cooperative programs in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Sakharov affair. In this case, publicly funded “science diplomacy” was a casualty—a regrettable one—of larger circumstances. But in those same years, cooperation between scientists of the United States and the Soviet Union continued, in some cases vigorously, through competitive federally funded research grants as well as private resources. It is very important that scientists do what they can on their own—and they often do—to ensure that their foreign colleagues remain an integral part of the world scientific community. Such voluntary initiatives by U.S. scientists in the early 1990s were the spark of the unprecedented explosion of support for science in the countries of the former Soviet Union over the next decade, fueled by enormous resources from both the public and nonprofit sectors. Campbell is right that we ought not to forget Ukraine. Here, the foreign policy goals of the United States are aligned with scientific goals. Indeed, the United States should now include vigorous science diplomacy as an integral part of our effort to help Ukraine be a viable country. Science and technology—with which Ukraine, as well as Russia, is well endowed as part of its post-Soviet legacy (perhaps even more so, on a per capita basis)—will be vital to Ukraine's economic health in today's global knowledge economy. The new Ukrainian government seems to recognize this: From its very first day, politicians and scientists started serious work on long-delayed reform of the Ukrainian science system. Competitive, investigator-initiated, merit-reviewed research funding is to grow from 20% of the publicly funded total to an ambitious goal of 80%, far surpassing the grandest of Russian ambitions in this arena. The United States should now reprogram its assistance funds, which support many of the science diplomacy programs through public and nonprofit performers, to give this effort and other Ukrainian science reforms a major boost. Especially in such a moment of crisis, science diplomacy can be, and has been, a force for positive change and even for the emergence of civil society. If we adopt a nuanced, and, as appropriate, selective approach to furthering international science cooperation, which is so vital to science and often so effective as a tool of foreign policy, we will both be more effective and supportive of our nation's interests in serious crises such as those we face today. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1257373 [2]: pending:yes

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