Scholarly Debate on Racial Profiling: To What End?

Abstract

This note is a contribution to a dialogue on exchange between Satzewich and Shaffir's (2009) paper on racism and professionalism and Henry and Tator's (2011) rejoinder. originating article and rejoinder take up an issue central to practice of racial profiling--do cultural elements of police work facilitate (or potentially inhibit) racist tendencies on part of individual officers; or relatedly, is police culture itself racist? One of important questions posed by exchange is whether presence of an underlying racism--as in overt hostility to minorities - is a necessary criterion for calling a practice racial profiling, or whether profiling is a cultural characteristic of organization. I will not attempt to answer this question, which is probably unanswerable in any case. I will focus instead on broader policy implications of exchange. First, I will briefly review papers. Brief review of papers How does one define racial profiling? Satzewich and Shaffir (2009) define racial profiling as heightened scrutiny based solely or in part on race, ethnicity, Aboriginality, place of origin ancestry, or religion, or on stereotypes associated with any of these factors (200). However, they do not directly attribute it to underlying racism--rather, it is a behavioural consequence of police culture. Profiling emerges from attentiveness to particular signals and 'unusual fits' (200). Profiling is, consequently, situated within broader context of police work. A vocabulary of actions enables police to perceive profiling as normal and routine to their everyday work. Satzewich and Shaffir (2009) develop a notion of (201)--defined as how police attend to charges against them of being racially motivated (211)--that is used to justify racial profiling. three elements of deflection rhetoric are intolerance of intolerance (denying existence of racial profiling by referring to recent changes in organizational structures that reflect police's commitment to diversity, tolerance, and fairness; Satzewich and Shaffir 2009: 212), discourse of multiculturalism (the claim that police could not possibly engage in racial profiling because their recruitment mechanisms are better than they were in past; 215) and discourse of blaming victim (if there is a problem, problem lies elsewhere, particularly in individuals and organizations who claim that racial profiling is a problem; 217). Police, however, do not view a selective focus on minorities as a racial issue. Rather, they tend to view racism through lens of personal and look at legal architecture of motive and degree of culpability to determine criminal responsibility (Satzewich and Shaffir 2009: 220). Henry and Tator (2011), in a rejoinder to Satzewich and Shaffir (2009), argue that racism should be studied from point of view of its consequences, not from perspective of motives of individuals. They note that human rights law looks at racism from point of view of its consequences to victim, not intent of perpetrator, which not be proved (Henry and Tator 2011: 66). Citing R v. Brown, they note that The police officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be based on subconscious racial stereotyping (66). In an effort to develop a concept of racism, authors argue that one should look, not only at overt behaviour, but also at the unintentional and sometimes traditional normative practices that result in serious inequalities (Henry and Tator 2011: 67). In police organizations, [w]hiteness is constructed as normative, informal social behaviour, culture of organization or department may render minority group members as second class citizens (67). Hence, racism may result, not from one's conscious decision making, but as a cultural phenomenon that is pre-conscious. …