Schmitt, Violence, and the Political

Abstract

The distinctive trait of the Schmittian political is the friend–enemy distinction with this distinction arising from a political decision regarding a perceived existential threat to the (way of) life of the political community. According to Schmitt, what is distinctive about the political is that it entails a reaction to a perceived violence that has been or is about to be committed against the community. If there is a lack of perceived violent threat, the other will be thought of as a political friend, if there is a perceived threat of violence, the other will become a political enemy (NE: 35). The Schmittian political is, therefore, premised on the existence of, actual or threatened, violence. Violence not only brings to the fore the question of the other, but, due to the existential threat inherent to violence, is the clearest justification for the political decision regarding how the other will be treated. To understand Schmitt’s political theology, we need, therefore, to understand his notion of violence, including the role it plays in the political. This will also reveal a substantial difference between Schmitt’s and Levinas’s conceptions of violence and, by extension, the political.