Schlick on the Meaning of “Good”

Abstract

AbstractThe paper discusses Schlick’s Problems of Ethics (1939; Fragen der Ethik, 1930). It comprises of two parts. The first part analyses Schlick’s metaethical views, his arguments against objective values and absolute norms, and his analysis of the meaning of “good” in general and “morally good” in particular. Further, it also tests these views against some plausible objections. The second part addresses an apparent tension in Schlick’s conception. The underlying general thesis of the Problems of Ethics is that philosophical ethics is an exclusively descriptive, non-normative endeavor: philosophy ought not aim at proving what the good is, which norms are objectively valid. Justification of values or norms may only consist in determining whether they are endorsed, judged as values or norms by a particular society. This is, however, the task of scientific ethics, i.e. empirical scientific research. In contrast with this proclaimed view, Schlick in the last chapter of the book also puts forth his own normative ethical views, i.e. his Principle of Happiness – apparently leaving the role of the moral philosopher and moral scientist behind and acting as a moralist. Moreover, it seems, that he relies on this normative principle to ground his analysis of the meaning of “morally good”. I suggest that this tension may be dissolved by turning to Schlick’s anthropology. One important characteristic of this anthropology is that humans by nature have altruistic inclinations, and this grounds that individuals may genuinely desire the welfare of society. This is supported by empirical observations, according to Schlick, hence a legitimate scientific ethical claim. But there is also another, more interesting and unique characteristic: Schlick seems to preserve elements of his earlier ethical views, he put forth in Lebensweisheit (1908) and in “Vom Sinn des Lebens” (1927), i.e. his Schillerian anthropology, according to which the essence of humanity is playing. For according to Schlick’s proposed “ethics of kindness” the ethics of desire and the ethics of demand may be synthesized by the ethics of love: acting morally means acting freely, without coercion, that is, acting playfully, in accordance with the essence of human nature. So our altruistic inclinations may be nurtured by Schillerian aesthetic-moral education.KeywordsMoritz SchlickMetaethicsHappinessAltruism