Abstract
While scholars have devoted considerable attention to U.S. trade policy in the 1930s, particularly the Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, little quantitative research focuses on the factors impinging upon elite decision makers who shaped Smoot‐Hawley. We look at 11 votes on the Senate floor related to Smoot‐Hawley to examine the impact of a variety of measures of constituency economic interests and member characteristics on elite decision making. Contrary to our expectations, the evidence does not support a pressure group model of policy making. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of political parties in making the Tariff Act of 1930.
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