Abstract
Spoofing attacks pose a clear cybersecurity risk for all systems relying on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for time synchronization or positioning. Secure Code Estimation and Replay (SCER) spoofing attacks are the most challenging type of spoofing attacks, as these may be problematic even for future GNSS protection systems, like Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) or Spreading Code Authentication (SCA). This is one of the reasons that make the development of complementary protection techniques, like the one proposed in this work, necessary. In the first part of the paper, the spoofing SCER attacks are analyzed in detail for GPS and, particularly, for Galileo. The role of the Galileo Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) intra-satellite non-orthogonality distortion term in hindering the attacks is discussed and a detailed comparison between GPS and Galileo expected quality curves for the SCER attack is provided. A complementary detection method for end-user receivers (assuming NMA is used) against SCER attacks is proposed, based on the application of machine learning and a proposed set of features extracted from the receiver search space, assuming the attacker was not able to null the satellite signal.
Highlights
A cryptographic protection system for the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message of the E1B signal is currently under development, based on TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) protocol
The Galileo Open Service signature solution for E1B, known as the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA), is intended to protect Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) users against attacks based on generating false GNSS signals
Taking the expectation and variance obtained into account, the theoretical expression in (24) and the Galileo curves presented in Fig. 1 are still applicable. These curves provide low detection probabilities, with integration times of 1 μs (Pd < 0.6) for C/N0 between 35dBHz to 50dBHz, which are good C/N0 for normal GNSS equipment. This implies that the Spreading Code Authentication (SCA) technique will be a good protection method against Secure Code Estimation and Replay (SCER), combined with NMA, as the SCER Spoofer detection probabilities will make the current attack approach very complicated: it will require working with very high C/N0
Summary
A cryptographic protection system for the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message of the E1B signal is currently under development, based on TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) protocol. The Galileo Open Service signature solution for E1B, known as the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA), is intended to protect GNSS users against attacks based on generating false GNSS signals. On the other hand, since it implies the rebroadcasting of a real signal, makes such protection, in some cases, unsuccessful This type of attacks could be detectable by the victim with a trustable time source, if the time delay introduced by the spoofer is big enough [3].
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