Scepticism, Truth and Religious Belief in the Thought of John Henry Newman: A Contribution to Contemporary Debate by Daniel John Pratt Morris-Chapman

Abstract

Reviewed by: Scepticism, Truth and Religious Belief in the Thought of John Henry Newman: A Contribution to Contemporary Debate by Daniel John Pratt Morris-Chapman John T. Ford, C.S.C. Scepticism, Truth and Religious Belief in the Thought of John Henry Newman: A Contribution to Contemporary Debate BY DANIEL JOHN PRATT MORRIS-CHAPMAN Dissertation at the University of Bristol. August 2014. Pages xxviii + 346 pages. Although there is abundant literature on John Henry Newman's numerous contributions to theology, spirituality, education, literature and history, Daniel Morris-Chapman is justified in claiming that "Newman's philosophical legacy has been underestimated" (viii). To remedy such minimization, this dissertation undertakes a five-step vindication of Newman's achievements as a philosopher. Morris-Chapman examines philosophical receptions of Newman beginning with his contemporaries and continuing to the present. Not only did British and American philosophers discuss and critique Newman's philosophical writings in the nineteenth century (19), but—surprisingly, given the unecumenical tenor of the times—"soon after its publication (1870) the Grammar of Assent was required reading for students studying in the philosophy department at Harvard" (36). Nonetheless, "Newman's rejection of evidentialist approaches to religious belief isolated his thought from many of his contemporaries" who wanted a scientific [End Page 121] approach to religion (59). Subsequently, however, the "turn to the subject" in twentieth-century philosophy prompted renewed interest in the personalist dimension of Newman's philosophical thought.1 As for Newman's recent influence, Morris-Chapman's second chapter points out that "Newman shares a number of philosophical connections" with two twenty-first century philosophers, Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999) and William Abraham (b. 1947) (115). This connection seems substantiated in regard to the influence of Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus (c.160–c.210) as well as the shared opposition to John Locke; however, one might well debate the extent to which Newman was "shaped by the Thomistic tradition" (98–110). Additionally, the claim that "Newman's conception of liberalism and Chisholm and Abraham's understanding of epistemological Methodism amount to the same thing" (93) is questionable; at most the latter might be construed as a subset of the former. The third chapter is a selective examination of Newman's writings in relation to the "particularist tradition" (that human knowledge begins with particular examples). This treatment is quite cogent regarding Newman's acceptance of the Aristotelian principle that different disciplines require different kinds of proof and also his rejection of Locke's view that only demonstrative types of proof are legitimate. Less satisfactory is the brief engagement (156–68) with Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine—a treatment that fails to notice, much less to appreciate, the implications of Newman's shift in terminology from "tests" in the 1845 edition to "notes" in the 1878 edition.2 The fourth chapter considers select aspects of Newman's Grammar of Assent. On the one hand, Morris-Chapman should be commended for pointing out Newman's evident influence on such philosophers, as Désiré-Joseph Mercier (1851–1926).3 On the other hand, much of this chapter is a rather obtuse discussion devoted to advancing the claim that Newman was "an epistemological particularist" and refuting the position of Marty Miller Maddox, who characterized Newman as an "epistemological methodist" (69).4 What is needed and [End Page 122] unfortunately lacking as a preliminary to this discussion is a succinct synopsis of the Grammar's salient features. Without such an overview, the discussion of the different types of assent, the three kinds of inference, and the nature and function of the illative sense, is confusing and sometimes questionable. The fifth, and final, chapter attempts to illustrate Newman's on-going contribution to the philosophy of religion by showing how William Abraham draws upon various aspects of Newman's philosophy, particularly the illative sense, as a way of Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation.5 This discussion, which fails to acknowledge the various "ideas" of revelation that were implicitly employed by Newman and seemingly also by Abraham, would have been immensely aided by a discerning use of Avery Dulles's Models of Revelation.6 In sum, on the plus side, this dissertation has made...