Abstract
ABSTRACTScepticism is central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project, both as a tool of criticism and, through its role in self-transformation, as a tool for responding to criticism. While its importance in his thought and its complexity have been acknowledged, exactly what kind of scepticism Nietzsche calls for still stands in need of analysis. Jessica Berry’s [Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011] comparison between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonian scepticism recognized the importance of the practical dimension of Nietzschean scepticism but distorted Nietzsche’s philosophy in attempting to paint it as Pyrrhonian in character. Earlier discussions recognize Nietzsche’s opposition to Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement and tranquillity. They have not, however, explored in sufficient detail Nietzsche’s sceptical practice and how it affects the individual. In this article, I combine Berry’s emphasis on scepticism as a practice with attention to the important differences between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonism. I outline Nietzsche’s scepticism as a transformative practice, arguing that its differences from Pyrrhonian scepticism are as illuminating as any similarities. The scepticism that Nietzsche advocates involves not just destruction of our beliefs but destruction of who we are, and at the same time as cultivating the capacity to do without certainty, requires an experimental engagement with our drives – allowing the creation of new values.
Highlights
Pierre Hadot (1995, 272), Michel Foucault (2005, 28) and Alexander Nehamas (1985, 2000) have all recognised in Nietzsche a continuation of the spirit of Hellenistic philosophy, in which philosophy is not a theoretical enquiry but a way of life.i The advantage of comparing Nietzsche to Hellenistic thinkers, such as the Pyrrhonian sceptics, is this brings us to the recognition that the same critical method that Nietzsche uses to diagnose a crisis in contemporary Europe and demonstrate the need for change contains the possibility of bringing about that change and curing the sickness of modern man
Jessica Berry has recently explored this affinity as a way to approach Nietzsche’s philosophy, and while she does not claim that Nietzsche is a Pyrrhonian sceptic she does argue for substantial similarities (2011, 24-25)
Sextus was well aware of the longstanding objection that scepticism did not allow one to act.ix In response he says the sceptics: ‘attending to what is apparent, live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we are not able to be utterly inactive.’ (PH I 23)x They ‘follow laws and customs and natural feelings, and so live without holding opinions.’ (PH I 231) Or as Diogenes Laertius puts it ‘we may chose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs.’ (DL IX 108) sceptics drink when they feel the impulsion of thirst, and pull their hand away from hot metal when they feel pain, without any need for a belief as to whether it is really hot
Summary
Pierre Hadot (1995, 272), Michel Foucault (2005, 28) and Alexander Nehamas (1985, 2000) have all recognised in Nietzsche a continuation of the spirit of Hellenistic philosophy, in which philosophy is not a theoretical enquiry but a way of life.i The advantage of comparing Nietzsche to Hellenistic thinkers, such as the Pyrrhonian sceptics, is this brings us to the recognition that the same critical method that Nietzsche uses to diagnose a crisis in contemporary Europe and demonstrate the need for change contains the possibility of bringing about that change and curing the sickness of modern man. To understand Nietzsche’s statements on scepticism and the role that it plays in his philosophy we need to recognise that for Nietzsche scepticism is a practical endeavour that has an effect on those who pursue it This suggests an important affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism. While, as I shall discuss below, Nietzsche questions the idea of a unified self, the task of breeding a new type operates at the level of the individual and requires that those who are up to the task undertake a ‘conscious employment of a unity of method’ (BGE 210) In his mature philosophy, Nietzsche is not looking for readers who are content to work on and cultivate an existing self, but hopes to inspire a select audience to radically transform the self, and to create beings very different from the modern men he saw around him. Before entering into this comparison, I want to set out the key features of Pyrrhonism, or at least the version of it that has come down to us
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