Abstract
Formal proof of security measure effectiveness and computation security is vitally important for trust in critical information systems. It should be realized that formal security verification must be carried out at each infrastructural level (from the hardware level to the application level) in the process of system design. Currently, computation security analysis on the application level remains the major challenge as it requires complex labeling of computing environment elements. Traditionally, to solve this problem, information flow control (IFC) methods are employed. Unlike access control mechanisms widely used in modern operating systems (OSs) and database management systems (DBMSs), IFC has limited application in software design and mostly comes down to trivial taint tracking. This paper describes an approach to full-fledged implementation of IFC in PL/SQL program units with the use of the PLIF platform. In addition, a general scheme of computation security analysis for enterprise applications that work with relational DBMSs is considered. The key advantage of our approach is the explicit separation of functions between software developers and security analysts.
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