Scarcity and Centralization

Abstract

European integration appears to be stagnating. Indeed, a fall-back to neo-national protectionism seems likely. This article postulates that the principal institutional concept of the European Community was designed for the centralized management of a growing economy. Consequently, an oncoming age of scarcity may require a different concept of integration. When shrinking resources require greater selectivity in investment planning and the costs of redistributive policies can no longer be well financed, collective centralized problem solving may very well fail. Starting from general hypotheses about the demerits of centralization, some of the effects of centralization in the EEC are discussed. They seem to indicate that problems of market harmonization, industrial concentration, and sectoral as well as spatial disparity have become aggravated under conditions of greater scarcity. Finally, it is argued that a more successful politics of scarcity may require a federal multiplicity of non-centralized institutions for the organization and maintenance of a diversified socioeconomic system. A concluding remark contrasts the myth of European unity with the diversity of the European sociocultural heritage.