Abstract
Scanlon's account of reasons is essential to his contractualism as a whole, providing an extensive foundation in practical reasoning for his theory. A full understanding of his account of reasons is therefore vital to understanding the nature of Scanlon's contractualism. With the aim of contributing to such an understanding, in this essay I reconstruct several of Scanlon's most significant arguments concerning reasons. I focus on two areas: his discussion of the role of desire in practical reasoning and his arguments for the claim that reason judgements should be seen as objective. I conclude that the weakness of one his claims regarding desire may cause substantial problems for his arguments in both of the areas examined.
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