Abstract
AbstractAntonin Scalia’s theory of judicial interpretation remains highly relevant in the legal landscape. This paper proposes three problems with Scalia’s textualism-originalism that have yet to be adequately addressed in the legal philosophical literature. The problems are consecutively introduced as theMadisonian Problem, thePromulgation Problem, and theFairness Problem. To explain these problems, I rely upon an understanding of coherent justification conceptualized by Keith Lehrer, and I utilize Feinbergian and Hobbesian modes of analysis. Key components of Scalia’s textualism-originalism will be developed using Scalia’s public discourse as well as Scalia’s dissent inMorrison v Olsen. Following the three problems, to be proposed in the style of the Lehrerian Critic, I will counter objections to my arguments as well as argue against an alternative form of criticizing Scalia.
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