Abstract

In the high-stakes race for scalability, some blockchains have turned to committee-based consensus (CBC), whereby the chain’s recordkeeping rights are entrusted to a committee of block producers elected via approval voting. Smaller committees boost speed and scalability but can compromise security when voters have limited information. In this environment, voting strategies are naturally nonlinear, and equilibria can become intractable. Despite this, we show that elections converge to optimality asymptotically (in voter numbers), exponentially quickly, and under relatively weak informational requirements. Compared to popular stake-weighted lottery and single-vote protocols used in practice, we find that CBC, when paired with approval voting, can offer meaningful efficiency and robustness gains if enough voters are engaged. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, Special Section of Management Science: Blockchains and Crypto Economics. Funding: This work was funded by The Hogeg Blockchain Research Institute. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03177 .

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