Abstract
In 2014, a new security definition of a revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) with signing key exposure resistance was introduced. Based on this new definition, many scalable RIBS schemes with signing key exposure resistance were proposed. However, the security of these schemes is based on traditional complexity assumption, which is not secure against attacks in the quantum era. Lattice-based cryptography has many attractive features, and it is believed to be secure against quantum computing attacks. We reviewed existing lattice-based RIBS schemes and found that all these schemes are vulnerable to signing key exposure. Hence, in this paper, we propose the first lattice-based RIBS scheme with signing key exposure resistance by using the left-right lattices and delegation technology. In addition, we employ a complete subtree revocation method to ensure our construction meeting scalability. Finally, we prove that our RIBS scheme is selective-ID existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-sID-CMA) under the standard short integer solutions (SIS) assumption in the random oracle model.
Highlights
Nowadays, dynamic management systems are becoming increasingly popular in enterprises and schools
In order to reduce the key generation center (KGC)’s overhead, Boldyreva et al [2] employed a binary tree to propose the rst scalable revocable identitybased encryption (RIBE) scheme, in which the overhead of the KGC is logarithmically increased based on the number of users
In 2013, Seo and Emura [6] found that all existing Boldyreva-based scalable RIBE schemes are vulnerable to decryption key exposure. ey improved the de nition and security model of RIBE and proposed the rst scalable RIBE with decryption key exposure resistance
Summary
Dynamic management systems are becoming increasingly popular in enterprises and schools. The KGC’s overhead increases linearly with the number of users, which results in issues with scalability Their scheme cannot avoid signing key exposure. (1) We study the approach used to achieve signing key exposure resistance in Seo et al.’s RIBS scheme and adopt Agrawal et al.’s left-right lattices and delegation technology to propose the first lattice-based RIBS scheme with signing key resistance (2) We set all the parameters to ensure our construction’s correctness and prove that our construction is selective-ID existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-sID-CMA) under the standard short integer solutions (SIS) assumption (3) Our revocation mechanism employs Boldyreva et al.’s binary tree structure to meet scalability needs and ensures that the KGC does not need to send periodic time update keys over secret channels
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