SCADA Security: An Attack Tolerant Approach

Abstract

To answer the cyber-attacks on SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, we wonder whether an attack tolerant approach can be implemented. Indeed, the most of networked control system security mechanisms are based on detection and rejection of the cyber-attacks control data. This rejection is easy to be detected by the attackers. As a result, the attackers will continue to improving their strategy in order to break down the security mechanism. They try until they reach their goals, and generally, during this time, there is no indication about presence of cyber-attacks. In addition to specific algorithms such Data Encryption Standard (DES), Message Digest (MD5), timestamp, a new security mechanism based on the deception for the cyber-attacks is proposed. This mechanism, from a mathematical model of the plant, can make that the attackers believe that he has achieved the wished purpose, as they receive indication on their actions within the sensor reading. As a result, the attackers stop to improve their attack method. So, to answer the cyber-attacks on SCADA System, an attack tolerant approach is proposed.