Abstract
SCADA for National Critical Infrastructures: Review of the Security Threats, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
Highlights
IntroductionSupervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural gas, crude oil, refined petroleum products such as gasoline, gas oil, water, waste. treatment, transportation) to citizens of a country
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities to citizens of a country
Supervisory system is used as server for communicating between the equipment of the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system such as Remote terminal units (RTUs), Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) and sensors, etc., and the Humanmachine Interface (HMI) software used in the control room workstations
Summary
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural gas, crude oil, refined petroleum products such as gasoline, gas oil, water, waste. treatment, transportation) to citizens of a country. They include - data acquisition, networked data communication, data presentation and control These four functions are performed by several kinds of SCADA components such as 1.) sensors (either digital or analog) and control relays. These directly interface with the managed system ; 2.) remote telemetry units (RTUs) are small-computerized units deployed in the field at single sites and locations. Numerous forms of malware targeting SCADA systems have been identified, including Stuxnet, Havex, and BlackEnergy3 [2] What these three forms of malware have in common is their ability to sneak through Industrial Control Systems (ICS) undetected by exploiting the weakest link in the cyber defense network (people) and posing as a legitimate e-mail or by finding a back door in the SCADA system. The power sector has already demonstrated itself to be vulnerable and must dedicate substantially more resources to closing back doors and training employees to avoid clicking on malicious files
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